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Some of my environmental law colleagues have long lamented 
that the Supreme Court is anti-environmental.' This assertion 
always struck me as unlikely. Why would nine intelligent, thinking 
* Professor of Law, Pace University School of Law, White Plains, New York. 
1 J. William Futrell, The Ungreening of the Supreme Court, ENVTL. F., Jan.-Feb. 1992 at 
12; Richard E. Levy & Robert L. Glicksman, Judicial Activism and Restraint in the 
Supreme Court's Environmental Law Decisions, 42 VAND.  L. REV. 343 (1989); A. Dan 
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persons be against the environment that nurtures us all? But then 
Professor Richard Lazarus began counting and demonstrated that 
a decided majority of the Court's environmental law decisions have 
anti-environmental  result^.^ Statistics alone, however, do not indi- 
cate that the Court has an anti-environmental bias. As Lazarus 
suggests, the statistics could reflect the resolution of conflicts 
between environmental values and other social or legal values 
embodied in the Constitution, statutes, or cross-cutting legal doc- 
t r i n e ~ . ~  Such conflicts would inevitably lead to some decisions 
counter to environmental values. A more qualitative analysis of 
the Court's opinions might suggest whether resolution of diverging 
values or an anti-environmental bias explains the majority of the 
Court's decisions. 
At the same time, some of the Court's environmental law deci- 
sions misconstrue the environmental statutes. Perhaps the envi- 
ronmental statutes are too long and complex for the Court to 
grasp. Years ago my tax law professors complained that "the 
Supreme Court just does not understand the Internal Revenue 
C ~ d e ! " ~  When many full-time tax practitioners cannot compre- 
hend the Code in its entirety, it may be too much to expect that the 
part-time tax practitioners on the Court could do so. Perhaps the 
sheer volume and complexity of environmental law, which rivals 
tax law,5 makes it equally difficult for the Court to comprehend. 
As a result, I have similarly complained to my students that "the 
Court just does not understand the Clean Water Act" (CWA).6 
Perhaps the concern of my colleagues with the apparent anti-envi- 
Tarlock, Is There a There in Environmental Law?, 19 FLA. ST. U. J. LAND USE & ENVTL. 
L. 213, 224 (2004). 
2 Richard J. Lazarus, Environmental Law and the Supreme Court: Three Years Later, 19 
PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 653 (2002) [hereinafter Lazarus, Three Years Later]; Richard J .  Laza- 
rus, Thirty Years of Environmental Protections Law in the Supreme Court, 17 PACE ENVTL. 
L. REV. 1 (1999) [hereinafter Lazarus, Thirty Years]. See also Richard J .  Lazarus, Restoring 
What's Environmental About Environmental Law in the Supreme Court, 47 UCLA L. REV. 
703 (2000). 
3 See Lazarus, Three Years Later, supra note 2, at 654. 
4 David Hurwitz, Professor, Harvard Law School, Lecture at the Harvard Law School 
(1966); Frank Sanders, Professor, Harvard Law School, Lecture at the Harvard Law School 
(1967). My tax colleagues, Professors Ron Jensen and Bridgett Crawford, tell me the com- 
plaint is as valid today as it was when I was a law student. 
5 The 2004 version of the Code of Federal Regulations contains: twenty volumes in Part 
26, regulations of the Internal Revenue Service under the Internal Revenue Code, and 
thirty volumes in Part 40, regulations of the Environmental Protection Agency under the 
environmental statutes it administers. Moreover, many of the EPA volumes are larger 
than the IRS volumes and the EPA volumes occupy about sixty percent more shelf space 
than the IRS volumes. See 26 C.F.R. $Q 1.1-801.6 (2004); 40 C.F.R. $0 1.1-1700.13 (2004). 
6 Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. $9 1251-1387 (2000). 
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ronmental tilt of the Court's decisions and my own concern with 
the Court's apparent misunderstanding of environmental statutes 
are related. The Court may not understand environmental law and 
thus be prone to analytical error, which in turn could lead to anti- 
environmental decisions. On the other hand, the Court could mis- 
takenly or purposefully misconstrue an environmental statute to 
reach results-oriented, anti-environmental decisions. Again, a 
more qualitative analysis of the Court's opinions may suggest why 
the Court's environmental decisions sometimes contain analytical 
errors and the relationship, if any, between the errors and anti- 
environmental results. 
A qualitative analysis of the over 240 cases Lazarus counted7 is 
beyond the scope of a single law review article. A qualitative 
examination of the Court's decisions under the CWA, however, is 
perfectly suited for this task. The Court has rendered twenty-three 
decisions under the CWA, more than any other statute imple- 
mented by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA); enough 
to form a critical mass susceptible to analysis within a single article. 
Most of the Court's early CWA opinions decided before 1980 
involved relatively simple issues of statutory interpretation. Addi- 
tionally, these decisions were relatively unaffected by legal values 
and doctrines beyond the CWA and were unanimously decided or 
decided by a strong majority. The results of these early decisions 
were overwhelmingly pro-en~ironmental.~ In contrast, many of the 
opinions decided after 1980 involved more complex issues of statu- 
tory interpretation and were often affected by legal values and doc- 
trines extrinsic to the CWA. These decisions were rarely 
unanimous. The results of these later decisions were overwhelm- 
ingly anti-environmental. It is tempting to speculate that the 
change from predominantly pro-environmental decisions to 
predominantly anti-environmental decisions occurred because of a 
change in the makeup of the Court, e.g., reflecting a difference 
between the Burger Court and the Rehnquist Court. However, the 
change from decisions with pro-environmental results to anti-envi- 
ronmental results occurred in 1980,1° a year when there were no 
changes in Justices. 
7 See Lazarus, Thirty Years, supra note 2 ,  at Appendix. 
8 See infra Table A. 
9 The same could be said for the Court's decisions under earlier water pollution legisla- 
tion. See infra notes 21-22. 
10 See infra Table B .  
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Qualitative analysis of the decisions reveals a surprising level of 
mistakes in the Court's interpretation of the CWA. In fact, two- 
thirds of the decisions contain analytical errors,ll mischaracterizing 
or acting in apparent ignorance of some statutory provisions perti- 
nent to the issues before the Court. While these mistakes were not 
always critical to the Court's decisions, the rate of error is greater 
in the post-1980 decisions than in the pre-1980 decisions and the 
severity of the errors is far greater in the post-1980 decisions. The 
rate of mistake is also greater in decisions with anti-environmental 
results than it is in decisions with pro-environmental results. Fur- 
thermore, the severity of the errors is much greater in the decisions 
with anti-environmental results. 
The apparent explanation for the change from decisions with 
pro-environmental results to anti-environmental results and the 
increase in the rate and severity of analytical errors in the Court's 
decisions before and after 1980 is a change in the nature of the 
CWA cases coming before the Court. Before 1980, all of the cases 
sought judicial review of EPA actions or appealed federal enforce- 
ment of the CWA. After 1980, ten of the fifteen decisions were 
either citizen suits, private common law nuisance actions against 
polluters, or appeals of state action. Because EPA action was not 
at issue in these decisions, the United States was not a party in 
most of the actions, although it often filed an amicus brief. When 
the United States was a party, its position did not necessarily 
represent the EPA's interpretation of the CWA, especially when 
the federal defendant was sued for violating the CWA.12 
This suggests that the anti-environmental tilt and the analytical 
mistakes resulted from a combination of the Court's ambivalence 
toward citizen enforcement13 and the absence of the EPA's partici- 
pation in framing the government's position explaining the CWA, 
especially in cases in which the Department of Justice represented 
the government as a polluter rather than as a guardian of the envi- 
l1 Id. These errors are identified and discussed in Part 111. 
12 In Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305 (1982), for instance, the Governor of 
Puerto Rico sued the Secretary of the Department of Defense to enjoin practice bombing 
in the ocean near Vieques Island without a CWA permit. Because the Solicitor General 
represented the Department as a defendant, the brief filed by the United States repre- 
sented the position of the CWA-violating Department rather than of the CWA-enforcing 
EPA. See discussion of Romero-Barcelo infra pp. 156-163 and accompanying notes 
168-204. 
13 The dissent in Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n 
(Sea Clammers), 453 U.S. 1, 25 (1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting), commented that in its 
recent decisions the Court had "been more and more reluctant to open the courthouse 
door to the injured citizen." 
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ronment and of the CWA. An examination of the briefs filed by 
the United States in these cases confirms this notion. A similar 
examination of the Court's opinions under other environmental 
statutes would indicate whether this is generally the case and might 
determine which aspect of the combination is dominant. 
Part I of this article sets the stage with a brief survey of federal 
water pollution control, focusing on the CWA. Part I1 examines 
statistical conclusions and inferences from a cursory review of the 
Court's CWA opinions. Part I11 examines some of the opinions in 
a more qualitative manner to determine whether the statistical con- 
clusions withstand analysis and whether the Court understands the 
CWA. The latter determination requires examining the nature and 
severity of the Court's misinterpretations of the statute. Part IV 
examines the Court's decisions with anti-environmental results to 
determine whether they reflect an anti-environmental bias or the 
other factors suggested. Table A lists the Court's opinions under 
the statutes administered by the EPA, documenting that the 
Court's CWA decisions outnumber those under any other EPA 
administered statute. Table B contains basic information about the 
Court's CWA opinions, from which the conclusions in Part I1 are 
drawn. 
Prior to 1972, federal water pollution legislation provided: 1) 
some funding to states for building local sewage treatment plants; 
2) research into the causes of, effects of, and cures for water pollu- 
tion; 3) technical expertise and guidance to states on developing 
water quality standards; and 4) cumbersome enforcement of poorly 
established pollution control requirements.14 Frustrated with this 
ineffective construct, federal regulators discovered the Refuse Act 
of 1899, a neglected statute that was designed to protect channels 
of navigation from siltation but read broadly enough to serve as an 
14 See Clean Water Restoration Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-753, 80 Stat. 1246; Water 
Quality Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-234, 79 Stat. 903. See also EPA v. Cal. ex rel. State 
Water Res. Control Bd., 426 U.S. 200, 200-209 (1976) (examining the pre-1972 program 
and contrasting it with the 1972 legislation). For a detailed account of pre-1972 efforts to 
control water pollution, see William L. Andreen, The Evolution of Water Pollution Control 
in the United States-State, Local and Federal Efforts, 1789-1972: Part 1, 22 STAN.  ENVTL. 
L.J. 145 (2003). 
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effective vehicle for pollution contr01.'~ The Refuse Act required a 
permit from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers ("Corps of Engi- 
neers") to introduce refuse into navigable waters. The EPA and 
the Corps of Engineers developed a permit program under which 
the Corps of Engineers issued permits requiring compliance with 
pollution reduction requirements specified by the EPA.16 A suit by 
environmentalists effectively ended this effort by requiring envi- 
ronmental impact statements under the National Environmental 
Policy Act (NEPA)17 to be issued with each permit.ls This set the 
stage for the wholesale revamping of federal water pollution legis- 
lation in 1972.19 
Although the pre-CWA water pollution control regime was 
largely ineffective, a number of water pollution cases reached the 
Supreme Court before enactment of that statute, including: several 
federal common law disputes between states,2O three appeals under 
the Refuse and one case under oil pollution legislation later 
incorporated into the CWA.22 
The Constitution vests the Supreme Court with original jurisdic- 
tion over disputes between states.23 As a result, states have 
15 33 U.S.C. 5 407 (2000). See William H. Rodgers, Jr., Industrial Water Pollution and 
the Refuse Act: A Second Chance for Water Quality, 119 U. PA. L. REV. 761, 762 (1971). 
16 Ray M. Druley, The Refuse Act of 1899, BNA E m .  REP., Monograph No. 11, Jan. 
28, 1972, at 10-16. 
17 42 U.S.C. $8 4321-4370f (2000). 
18 Kalur v. Resor, 335 F. Supp. 1, 15 (D.D.C. 1971). See also EPA v. Cal., 426 U.S. at 
203. 
19 Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 
Stat. 816. 
20 See infra notes 24-26 and accompanying discussion. 
21 United States v. Pa. Indus. Chem. Corp., 411 U.S. 655, 674 (1973) (noting that the 
government may prosecute a defendant discharging refuse into a navigable water without a 
permit issued by the Corps of Engineers, even in the absence of a formal program to issue 
such permits, but that it was an error not to admit evidence that defendant reasonably 
relied on statements by the Corps of Engineers that no permit was necessary); United 
States v. Standard Oil Co., 384 U.S. 224,230 (1966) (upholding a prosecution for an oil spill 
from vessel against an argument that commercially valuable oil was not refuse); United 
States v. Republic Steel Corp., 362 U.S. 482,490 (1960) (noting that the government may 
seek an injunction against discharge of industrial waste causing siltation of a channel and 
noting that industrial waste was not covered by the "streets and sewers" exception). 
22 Askew v. Am. Waterways Operators, 411 U.S. 325, 328 (1973) (holding that federal 
oil spill legislation did not pre-empt state oil spill legislation absent a clear conflict). The 
oil spill legislation was enacted as the Water Quality Improvement Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 
91-224, 84 Stat. 91 (codified prior to 1972 at 33 U.S.C. 5 1161, later incorporated into the 
CWA as 5 311,33 U.S.C. 5 1321 (2000)). However, the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, Pub. L. 
No. 101-380, 104 Stat. 484 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. 55 2701-2761 (2000)), largely 
supplanted 5 311. 
23 U.S. CONST. art. 111, 5 2, cl. 2. 
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brought to the Court many of their disputes over rights to or 
revolving around interstate waters. The cases have included bor- 
der disputes caused by shifting boundary disputes over 
rights to use and consume common and disputes over pol- 
lution of a downstream state's water by sources of pollution 
located in other states upstream.26 Opinions in these interstate dis- 
putes culminated in Illinois v. M i l ~ a u k e e , ~ ~  in which the Court rec- 
ognized a federal common law of nuisance caused by interstate 
water pollution. The Court rendered this opinion on April 24, 
1972, noting that water pollution legislation was pending and "new 
federal laws and new federal regulations may in time pre-empt the 
field of federal common law of nuisance."28 
B. The CWA 
The 1972 legislati~n?~ now commonly called the Clean Water 
Act or CWA,3O divided all water pollution sources into two groups: 
24 Georgia v. South Carolina, 497 U.S. 376,379 (1990); Louisiana v. Mississippi, 466 U.S. 
96,99 (1984); Ohio v. Kentucky, 444 U.S. 335,336 (1980); Texas v. Louisiana, 410 U.S. 702, 
707 (1973); Minnesota v. Wisconsin, 252 U.S. 273,276 (1920); Iowa v. Illinois, 147 U.S. 1 , 2  
(1893). 
Colorado v. New Mexico, 467 U.S. 310,312 (1984); Colorado v. New Mexico, 459 U.S. 
176,177 (1982); Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546,551 (1963); Washington v. Oregon, 297 
U.S. 517, 518 (1936); Nebraska v. Wyoming, 295 U.S. 40, 41 (1935); New Jersey v. New 
York, 283 U.S. 336, 341 (1931); Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 282 U.S. 660, 662 (1931); 
Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419, 455 (1922); Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 47 
(1907). 
26 Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 93 (1972); New Jersey v. New York, 347 U.S. 995, 
995 (1954); New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 473, 476 (1931); Georgia v. Tenn. Copper 
Co., 206 U.S. 230, 236 (1907); Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496, 517 (1906). 
27 406 U.S. 91, 107 (1972). 
28 Id. 
29 William L. Andreen, Water Quality Today-Has the CWA Been a Success?, 55 ALA. 
L. REV. 527 (2004), is a timely description and analysis of the operation and effectiveness 
of the CWA which also cites much of the pertinent literature. Also see the leading envi- 
ronmental law treatises: 2 FRANK P. GRAD, TREATISE ON ENVIRONMENTAL AW 
5 3.01-3.05 (2004), and 1 WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR. ENVIRONMENTAL AW: AIR & 
WATER $ 5  1.1-3.41 (1986). 
30 The original water pollution control legislation, which passed on June 30, 1948, was 
known as the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA), Pub. L. No. 80-845,62 Stat. 
1155 (1948) (codified prior to 1972 at 33 U.S.C. 55 1151-1165). Congress completely 
amended this Act in 1972, creating the same basic form and content which exists today, 
despite numerous subsequent amendments. It continued to be known as the FWPCA until 
the Clean Water Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-217, 91 Stat. 1577. Although 
the 1977 amendments adopted "Clean Water Act" or "CWA" as the name of the amending 
statute rather than the name of the underlying statute (see the Historical and Statutory 
Notes following 33 U.S.C.A. 5 1251 (2000)), environmental practitioners quickly adopted 
the far more appealing CWA nomenclature. The Supreme Court first adopted it in Chemi- 
cal Manufacturers Ass'n v. Natural Res. Def: Counsel (NRDC), 470 U.S. 116, 118 (1985). 
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point sources and non-point sources. Pipes and other conveyances 
carry point source pollution to surface water. Storm water runoff 
carries non-point source pollution to surface water.31 The CWA 
erects a sophisticated and effective regulatory system to control 
and reduce pollution from point sources. The CWA32 establishes 
only the suggestion, not the requirement, of creating what amounts 
to an ineffective state-run program for dealing with pollution from 
non-point sources.33 Predictably, the Court's decisions have dealt 
only with the point source program. 
The prohibition against the addition of any pollutant to a naviga- 
ble water from a point source that is without a permit or in viola- 
tion of a permit is the basis of the CWA's regulatory program.34 
The CWA establishes a permit program administered by the EPA 
to control point-source discharges of pollutants35 and a separate 
permit program administered by the Corps of Engineers to control 
filling of wetlands.36 The EPA and the Corps of Engineers were 
the original and remain the default permit issuing authorities for 
their respective programs. However, a state may develop an 
equivalent permit program and submit it to the EPA or the Corps 
of Engineers for approval. Either entity must approve a state pro- 
gram if it meets federal standards, and thereafter the state, not the 
federal agency, is the permit issuing a~thority.~' Most states oper- 
31 While the point sourcelnon-point source distinction is clear in most cases, it is blurred 
in others. For instance, courts have held that man-made piles of material placed so that 
rain water runoff naturally forms channels into navigable waters are point sources in Sierra 
Club v. Abston Construction Co., 620 F.2d 41, 47 (5th Cir. 1980), and they are not point 
sources in Appalachian Power Co. v. Train, 545 F.2d 1351,1373 (4th Cir. 1976). Perhaps as 
a result, courts have ruled that the EPA has considerable discretion to define point sources 
by rule as indicated by NRDC v. Costle, 568 F.2d 1369, 1380 (D.C. Cir. 1977). 
32 CWA 5 208, 33 U.S.C. 5 1288 (2000). 
33 See Richard A. March et al., Nonpoint Source Water Pollution Section 208 Planning: 
Legal and Institutional Issues, 1981-1982 AGRIC. L. REV. 324, 349; Lawrence P. Wilkins, 
The Implementation of Water Pollution Control Measures - Section 208 of the Water Pollu- 
tion Control Act Amendments, 15 LAND & WATER L. REV. 479, 496 (1980). 
3-1 CWA 5 301(a), 33 U.S.C. 5 1311(a) (2000) (elaborated by CWA 5 502(12), 33 U.S.C. 
5 1362(12) (2000)). To expedite issuance of permits, CWA 5 511(c), 33 U.S.C. 5 1361(c) 
(2000), exempted the issuance of pollution control permits to existing sources from the 
requirements of NEPA, thus solving the problem that caused the Refuse Act permit pro- 
gram to abort. See Kalur v. Resor, 335 F. Supp. 1, 10 (D.D.C. 1971). 
35 CWA Q 402, 33 U.S.C. 5 1342 (2000). 
36 CWA 5 404, 33 U.S.C. 5 1344 (2000). 
37 The Corps of Engineers, however, may only approve state programs for waters that 
are not within the traditional federal jurisdiction for improvement and maintenance of 
navigation. CWA Q 404(g), 33 U.S.C. 5 1344(g) (2000). 
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ate approved pollution control programs today, but few operate 
approved wetlands protection programs.38 
Pollution control permits, whether issued by the EPA or a state 
with an approved program, must require the permit holder to treat 
its wastewater to levels reflecting the more stringent of either: 1) 
the level established by a nationally applicable technology-based 
standard for the particular industry promulgated by the EPA, or 2) 
the level necessary to achieve water quality standards designated 
for the receiving water, developed by states and the EPA.39 The 
statute requires industrial point sources to meet two progressively 
more stringent levels of technology-based standards over time, but 
requires municipalities to meet only one level.40 If the EPA is the 
permit issuing authority, a state in which the pollution discharge 
occurs has the opportunity to certify conditions in the permit nec- 
essary to meet the requirements of the CWA and appropriate state 
law.41 Those conditions must be included in the federal permit. 
Permits also require the permit holder to self-monitor its effluent 
for compliance with the permit's effluent limitations and to report 
the results to the EPA.42 Those reports are public information and 
effluent data is not entitled to confidential treatment.43 
The CWA provides the EPA with information gathering and 
inspection a~thority;~ as well as a full array of enforcement sanc- 
tions for discharges of pollutants without permits or in violation of 
CWA § 402 permits, whether the EPA or a state is the permit issu- 
ing a ~ t h o r i t y . ~ ~  It provides citizens with authority to sue violators 
if the United States or an individual State has not done so.46 The 
citizen suit provision also authorizes citizens to sue the EPA for 
38 Only five states lack approved § 402 permit programs, although thirteen states just 
have partially approved programs. See Environmental Protection Agency State NPDES 
Program Authority Website, http:llwww.epa.govlnpdeslimageslState~NPDES~ProgAuth: 
pdf (last visited Oct. 6, 2005). By contrast, only two states have approved 5 404 programs, 
primarily because of the lack of funding and the exclusion from the coverage of state pro- 
grams of traditionally defined navigable waters. See Environmental Protection Agency 
Wetlands Website, http:/lwww.epa.gov/owow/wetlandslfacts/fact23.html (last visited Oct. 6, 
2005). 
39 CWA 5 301(b), 33 U.S.C. 5 1311(b) (2000). 
40 Id. 
41 CWA 5 401, 33 U.S.C. 0 1341 (2000). 
42 40 C.F.R. $ 8  122.44.45 (2004). 
43 CWA 5 308(b), 33 U.S.C. 1318(b) (2000). 
44 CWA § 308(a), 33 U.S.C. 5 1318(a) (2000). 
45 CWA § 309,33 U.S.C. 8 1319 (2000). CWA 5 404(s), 33 U.S.C. 8 1344(s) (2000) (pro- 
viding the Corps of Engineers with enforcement authority against violations of § 404 
permits). 
16 CWA 5 505, 33 U.S.C. 0 1365 (2000). 
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failure to perform a mandatory duty under the statute. The 1972 
legislation created a major program of federal construction grants 
for local sewage treatment plants:' later morphing into a revolving 
fund administered by states.48 Finally, the CWA incorporates free- 
standing programs for oil spill prevention and remediation and for 
control of sewage from vessels.49 
The Court's opinions deal with issues arising in all but two of 
these major aspects of the CWA.50 Its decisions occur in judicial 
review of final administrative actions by the EPA and the Corps of 
Engineers (for example, the promulgation of rules, the issuance or 
denial of permits, and the assessment of administrative penalties) 
as well as for non-administrative actions such as civil and criminal 
actions, citizen suits against the EPA for not performing mandatory 
duties, citizen suits against violating members of the regulated pub- 
lic, and state certification of conditions to be placed in permits. 
A. The Scoreboard 
The results of the Court's decisions may be labeled pro- or anti- 
environmental,5' depending on whether they restrict or expand the 
CWA's jurisdictional or substantive provisions controlling water 
pollution52 or its procedural provisions for implementing and 
enforcing the pollution control program.53 It might be assumed 
47 CWA 99 201-221, 33 U.S.C. 99 1281-1301 (2000). 
48 CWA $5 601-607, 33 U.S.C. $9 1381-1387 (2000). 
49 CWA 9 311, 33 U.S.C. 9 1321 (largely replaced by the Oil Pollution Act, 33 U.S.C. 
98 2701-2753 (2000)). 
50 The exceptions are CWA 9 308, 33 U.S.C. 8 1318 (2000) (giving EPA authority to 
gather information, require the submission of information, and conduct inspections), and 
CWA 9 312, 33 U.S.C. Q 1321 (2000) (regulating the discharge of sewage from vessels). 
5 1  Lazarus was able to categorize most of the Court's over 240 environmental law deci- 
sions, including all of the decisions he considered under the CWA. See Lazarus, Thirty 
Years, supra note 2, at 27-32. 
52 In Environmental Protection Agency v. National Crushed Stone Ass'n, 449 U.S. 64,66 
n.2 (1980), the Court's decision, upholding an EPA regulation allowing variances in pre- 
treatment standards for toxic pollutants, restricts the prohibition in 9 402(1), 33 U.S.C. 
9 1342(1), against variances from technology-based standards for toxic pollutants. The 
decision could thus be considered anti-environmental. 
53 In Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 414-15, 427 (1987), the Court's decision that a 
jury trial is required to determine liability for a civil penalty under CWA 8 309, 33 U.S.C. 
9 1319, could make it more difficult to enforce the statute and may thus be considered anti- 
environmental. Some predicted Tull would discourage the government from seeking civil 
penalties in such cases. See Mark Dyner, Tull v. United States: Jury Trial Required in Statu- 
tory Civil Penalty Actions, 1988 UTAH L. REV. 435,449-50 (1988); Barbara L. Lah, Right to 
Trial by Jury in an Action for Civil Penalties and Injunctive Relief under the Clean Water 
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that sound decisions under a statute intended to restore and main- 
tain water quality would be pro-environmental decisions, but the 
CWA is not a one-dimensional statute blindly pursuing clean water 
regardless of other values. For instance, in establishing technology- 
based standards for water pollution control, the statute considers 
the costs of pollution control t e~hnology .~~  It also considers the 
implementation of the pollution control program by a complex 
partnership of federal and state governments to be a value in itself, 
even if another arrangement might abate water pollution more effi- 
ciently or effe~tively.~~ Moreover, even if the CWA was a single- 
minded edict, it does not exist in isolation, but is embedded in the 
totality of the American legal system, inevitably intersecting with 
constitutional, statutory, and judicial measures promoting or pro- 
tecting other social and legal values. In reconciling conflicts within 
the CWA or between the CWA and other components of the legal 
system, even a pro-environmental Court could not be expected to 
render decisions with pro-environmental results in all cases. 
In terms of raw numbers, the Court's decisions reach anti-envi- 
ronmental results in thirteen of twenty-three cases, or in 56% of 
the cases.56 That is not much of an imbalance. On the other hand, 
its pre-1980 decisions reached anti-environmental results in one of 
eight cases, or in 12.5% of the cases, while its post-1980 decisions 
reached anti-environmental results in eleven of fifteen cases or in 
73% of the cases.57 On the face if it, that seems seriously out of 
balance. The post-1980 decisions were also considerably more con- 
tentious than the earlier ones. While only two of the eight earlier 
decisions had dissents, with never more than two dissenters, all but 
three of the last fifteen decisions had dissents, six of them with 
three or more  dissenter^.^^ 
Act, 28 NAT. RESOURCES J. 607,621 (1988); Charles Openchowski, Changing the Nature of 
Federal Enforcement of Environmental Laws, 17 ENVTL. L. REP. 10304, 10306-307 (1987). 
54 See CWA 5 302(b), 33 U.S.C. 9 1312(b) (2000); CWA $5 304(b)(l)(B), (2)(B), (3), & 
(4)(B)-(C), 33 U.S.C. $9 1314(b)(l)(B), (2)(B), (3), & (4)(B)-(C) (2000). The Court dis- 
cussed the role of cost in developing the effluent guidelines in E.I. du Pont de Nemours & 
Co. v. Train, 430 U.S. 112, 129-31 n.21 (1977). 
55 The partnership and some of the strains in the partnership are described in EPA v. 
California ex rel. State Water Resources Control Board, 426 U.S. 200, 202 (1976); Interna- 
tional Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481,487-92 (1987); Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 
1 (1992); United States Department of Energy v. Ohio, 503 U.S. 607, 611 (1992). 
56 See infra Table B. 
57 See infra Table B. The contrast is emphasized by the Court's generally pro-environ- 
mental decisions under earlier water pollution control legislation. See supra notes 21-22. 
58 See infra Table B. While the greater dissention in the latter cases does not explain 
their anti-environmental tilt, the fact that the pro-environmental dissents came overwhelm- 
ingly from two Justices-Justices Stevens (eight pro-environmental dissents) and Black- 
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Before concluding that the Court's post-1980 decisions are hope- 
lessly anti-environmental, it should be noted that three of its four 
latest decisions have pro-environmental results. Moreover, the 
anti-environmental effects of some of the other, later decisions are 
of minor ~ignificance.~~ Finally, many of the decisions with anti- 
environmental results do not reflect the Court consciously picking 
the least pro-environmental among the possible interpretations of 
the statute. Instead, they result from the Court reconciling the 
CWA with the Constitution, other statutes, and cross-cutting judi- 
cial doctrines that have lives far beyond the CWA.60 Where such 
cross-cutting issues were at play, the environmental position pre- 
vailed in three cases and lost in ten, prevailing in 23% of the cases. 
Where cross-cutting issues were not at play, the environmental 
position prevailed in six cases and lost in four, prevailing in 60% of 
the cases.61 
A more disturbing observation about the eleven post-1980 deci- 
sions with anti-environmental results is that seven of them were 
citizen enforcement or private federal common law public nuisance 
actions.(j2 The repeated anti-environmental rulings of the Court 
against citizen suits and private actions raise the question of 
whether the Court is unsympathetic with that aspect of open gov- 
mun (five pro-environmental dissents)-may not bode well for pro-environmental 
decisions under the CWA in the future. 
59 For instance, while Chemical Manufactures Ass'n v. NRDC, 470 U.S. 116, 134 (1985), 
upholds the EPA's authority to  grant variances from technology-based standards for toxic 
pollutants, the EPA's record of granting only four variance requests in the first twelve 
years of its administration of the CWA-noted by the Court in footnote twelve-suggests 
that the availability of the variance will not result in a flood of variances for toxics. 
60 Preemption of federal common law by federal statutes is addressed in Illinois v. Mil- 
waukee, 451 U.S. 304 (1987); private rights of action were implied from federal statutes in 
Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 11, 14 
(1981); equitable discretion in granting injunctions is discussed in Weinberger v. Romero- 
Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 318 (1982); preemption of state common law by federal statutes 
appears in International Paper Co. v. Ouellene, 479 U.S. 481 (1987); right to trial by jury in 
civil penalty cases is outlined in Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 427 (1987); sovereign 
immunity is addressed in United States Department of Energy v. Ohio, 503 U.S. 607 (1992); 
the American rule that all litigants pay their own attorney fees is expressed in City o f  
Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557, 565-66 (1992); the reach of Commerce Clause jurisdic- 
tion is discussed in Solid Waste Authority of Northern Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps o f  
Engineers, 531 U.S. 159, 173 (2001). 
61 See infra Table B .  
62 See infra Table B .  Two of the decisions were judicial reviews of EPA actions and 
deference to the implementing agency explains these two decisions. If the decisions have 
anti-environmental results and the Court defers to agency action in an even-handed man- 
ner, their anti-environmental tilt originates with the EPA, not with the Court. Addition- 
ally, one decision was a government enforcement action and one was a CWA § 404 permit 
denial by the Corps of Engineers. 
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ernrnent. The question becomes more serious when the outcome 
of these private suits is combined with the outcome of suits with 
cross-cutting issues. Before 1980, in cases with a cross-cutting 
issue, the anti-environmental position prevailed in two of four 
cases, or in 50% of the cases. In the one case in which private 
plaintiffs brought an action with a cross-cutting issue, the anti-envi- 
ronmental position prevailed. After 3.980, when there was a cross- 
cutting issue, the anti-environmental position prevailed in eight 
cases and lost in one, prevailing in 88% of the cases. When a pri- 
vate party brought such a case, the anti-environmental position 
prevailed in seven out of eight cases, prevailing in 85% of the 
cases. This suggests that the private nature of these suits influences 
their outcome as much as the presence or absence of a cross-cut- 
ting issue, and that both are important factors. Those decisions are 
worth examining with that question in although it probably 
cannot be answered conclusively by examining only decisions aris- 
ing under the CWA. 
B. The Headcount 
Richard Lazarus surveyed over 240 decisions rendered by the 
Supreme Court under the environmental statutes, and he con- 
cluded that neither the Court nor the individual Justices appreciate 
"environmental law as a distinct area of law."64 The fact that Jus- 
tice White wrote more opinions in those cases than any of the other 
Justices reinforces Lazarus7 conclusion, because Justice White's 
opinions do not "suggest any distinct vision of the role of law in 
environmental pr~tec t ion ."~~ While Justice Kennedy voted with 
the majority in virtually one hundred percent of the environmental 
decisions, he never wrote an opinion. The anomaly between Ken- 
nedy's critical vote in environmental decisions and his apparent 
lack of interest in the issues they raise further reinforced Lazarus7 
conc l~s ion .~~  Finally, Lazarus found that while Justice Douglas 
voted for the environmental position one hundred percent of the 
time, only three other Justices voted for such positions more than 
half the time.67 Because Douglas left the Court in 1974, his perfect 
voting record did not have much of an impact on the course of 
modern environmental law. The lack of a more long-lived voice 
63 This examination is made in Part 111. 
@ Lazarus, Thirty Years, supra note 2, at 3. 
65 Id. at 5. 
66 Id. at 6-7. 
67 Brennan, 58.5%; Marshall, 61.3%; and Stevens, 50.6%. Id. at 11. 
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for the environment on the Court could go a long way in account- 
ing for Lazarus' conclusions. 
Conducting the headcount with CWA decisions confirms the 
bulk of Lazarus' observations, although it raises interesting differ- 
ences. Again, Justice White wrote more decisions in CWA cases 
than any other Justice, but those decisions lack an overarching 
environmental view.68 Yet his dissent in U.S. Department of 
Energy v. Ohio (DOE)69 speaks eloquently of the massive failure 
of federal facilities to shoulder their environmental responsibilities 
and of the Court depriving citizens and states of a "powerful 
weapon in combating federal agencies that.persist in despoiling the 
environment" by taking an unduly narrow reading of the congres- 
sional waiver of sovereign immunity in CWA 9 313.70 Again, Jus- 
tice Kennedy is always in the majority on CWA decisions and has 
never written an opinion.'l But Justice Douglas is no longer the 
only Justice with a perfect pro-environment record; he is joined by 
Justices Breyer and G i n ~ b e r g . ~ ~  And whilk Lazarus could identify 
only three Justices voting for pro-environmental decisions fifty per- 
cent of the time or more, in CWA decisions, eight Justices have 
done so.73 
Lazarus ended his survey with cautious optimism, noting that the 
Court had just granted a writ of certiorari filed by environmental 
plaintiffs in what would become Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw 
Environmental Services (TOC), Znc. l laid la^).^^ He noted that the 
68 Justice White wrote six, Justice Rehnquist three, and Stevens, Marshall, and Powell 
each wrote two. See infra Table B. 
69 503 U.S. 607, 629 (1992). 
70 33 U.S.C 0 1323 (2000). 
71 Justice Kennedy did author a one paragraph concurrence in Friends of the Earth v. 
Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 197 (2000), raising the dis- 
turbing issue of whether the authorization of citizens to seek civil penalties for violations of 
the CWA under 8 505,33 U.S.C. 8 1365, usurps the constitutional prerogative of the execu- 
tive branch, thus violating separation of powers principles. This appears to be a non-issue, 
because separation of powers conflicts arise where one branch of government invades the 
constitutional prerogative of another branch, e.g., Congress invading the President's pre- 
rogative in legislation asserting the right to veto otherwise valid presidential action. Immi- 
gration and Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 945-46 (1983). Citizen suits do 
not represent congressional usurpation of executive power, for they retain no power in 
Congress and the executive branch may prevent a citizen suit by taking an enforcement 
action. 
72 See infra Table B. 
73 See infra Table B (showing the following pro-environmental records for Supreme 
Court justices: Brennan, 50%; Burger, 56%; Blackmun, 68%; Kennedy, 59%; Marshall, 
63%; Souter, 59%; Stevens, 81; and White, 58%). 
74 Lazarus, Thirty Years, supra note 2, at 21. The Court granted certiorari in Laidlaw at 
525 U.S. 1176 (1999), and decided the case at 528 U.S. 167 (2000). 
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Court had not granted a writ of certiorari at the exclusive request 
of an environmental plaintiff since 1972 and that there was no rea- 
son for it to do so unless it desired to overturn the Fourth Circuit's 
decision against the environmental plaintiffs. The Court's decision 
in the case was better than he could have hoped, as he subse- 
quently e ~ p l a i n e d . ~ ~  
The good news does not stop with Laidlaw. Three of the Court's 
last four CWA decisions have favored the pro-environmental posi- 
tions. Justice O'Connor authored two of these decisions.76 She has 
also voted for the pro-environmental position in six of the thirteen 
decisions (46%) in which she participated. Two of her six pro-envi- 
ronmental votes were in dissent, and in two of the remaining four 
she wrote the majority opinion. Moreover, her voting position 
migrated over the years. Before City of Burlington v. Dague 
( D a g ~ e ) , ~ ~  her votes were for pro-environmental positions in only 
two out of eight decisions or 25% of the time; since Dague, her 
votes have been for pro-environmental positions in four out of five 
decisions or 80% of the time. While some of these later votes may 
be explained by other preferences,'* in the aggregate they will 
make environmentalists regret her departure from the Court. Nev- 
ertheless, the history of Justice O'Connor's evolution in CWA deci- 
sions suggests that some Justices can and do become progressively 
more pro-environmental during their terms on the Court. 
IV. QUALITATIVE CONCLUSIONS 
A. Does the Court Have a CWA Jurisprudence? 
The Court has decided twenty-three cases under the CWA. 
Even though the Court does not always have a firm grasp on the 
75 See Lazarus, Three Years Later, supra note 2, at 658-59 (noting that Laidlaw "was a 
significant victory for the environmental community," reversing a series of decisions that 
had progressively narrowed standing for environmental plaintiffs). 
76 In the first of those decisions, PUD No. 1 of Jefferson County v. Washington Depart- 
ment of Ecology, 511 U.S. 700, 703, 709-10 (1994), however, the environmental position 
coincided with the states' rights position. This lent a note of caution to hopes that Justice 
O'Connor was becoming an environmental convert. In the second, South Flordia Water 
Management District v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 531 U.S. 95 (2003), the Court rejected 
the anti-environmental position on one issue and hinted that it would reject an anti-envi- 
ronmental argument on a second, but did not reach it, instead remanding it for considera- 
tion by the lower courts in light of the facts already found by the lower courts. The dissent 
suggested the Court easily could have rejected the second argument without remanding it. 
Id. at 112. 
77 505 U.S. 557 (1992). 
78 Her position in PUD No. 1, 511 U.S. at 722-23, for instance, could reflect a states' 
rights bias. 
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statute, it might be expected to have developed a consistent juris- 
prudence in the course of those decisions. One indication of the 
extent to which it has developed a CWA jurisprudence is the fre- 
quency with which its CWA opinions cite its earlier CWA opinions. 
Surprisingly, nine of the opinions do not cite even one other CWA 
opinion and ten of the opinions are not cited by any subsequent 
CWA opinion.79 On average, a CWA opinion cites fewer than two 
other CWA opinions.s0 This lack of interest in previous opinions 
does not stem from their lack of relevance to the issues at hand. 
Tull v. United States ( T ~ l l ) ~ l  did not cite United States v. Ward 
(Ward),82 although both considered the punitive nature of the 
CWA's civil penalties. DOEs3 did not cite EPA v. California ex rel. 
State Water Resource Control Board (California Board),84 although 
both considered the extent of the CWA's waiver of sovereign 
immunity. Crown Simpson Pulp Co. v. Costle (Crown S i r n p s ~ n ) ~ ~  
did not cite E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train (E.I. du 
P ~ n t ) , ~ ~  although both interpreted CWA 9 509(b), the provision 
governing judicial review of EPA final agency actions in courts of 
appeals. South Florida Water Management District v. Miccosukee 
Tribe of Indians ( M i c c o s ~ k e e ) ~ ~  did not cite United States v. River- 
side Bayview Homes, Inc. (Riverside bay vie^)^^ or Solid Waste 
Agency of North Cook County (SWANCC) v. U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers (SWANCC),s9 although all three interpreted "navigable 
waters." 
Although the Supreme Court may have developed a rudimen- 
tary "worldview" of the CWA, the Court can forget that worldview 
at the drop of a hat when it gets in the way of a decision the Court 
seems determined to make.90 With the complexity of the statute 
79 See infra Table B. These numbers exclude the earliest CWA opinion from the deci- 
sions citing no other CWA opinion and the latest CWA opinion from the decisions not 
cited by other decisions. 
80 See infra Table B. 
81 481 U.S. 412 (1987). 
82 448 U.S. 242 (1980). 
83 503 U.S. 607 (1992). 
@ 426 U.S. 200 (1976). 
85 445 U.S. 193 (1980). 
86 430 U.S. 112 (1977). 
87 541 U.S. 95 (2004). 
474 U.S. 121 (1985). 
89 531 U.S. 159 (2001). 
90 In Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 314 (1982), for instance, the Court 
quipped that "[tlhe integrity of the Nation's waters . . . not the permit process" is the 
purpose of the CWA, while rejecting automatic injunctions against discharging pollutants 
into navigable waters from point sources without a permit. But in International Paper Co. 
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being interpreted, the Court's deference to the EPA's interpreta- 
tion could be expected to be considerable and consistent. Indeed, 
the Court's developing jurisprudence of deference is evident in its 
CWA  decision^.^' But again, the Court can forget about deference 
entirely when it gets in the way of a decision the Court seems 
determined to make.92 
Despite the opportunity to develop a consistent view of the 
CWA in the course of its twenty-three opinions, the Court has not 
done so. Its decisions are more driven by the presence or absence 
v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 494-96 (1987), the Court found the integrity and administer- 
ability of the permit program of sufficient importance that it pre-empted the common law 
of nuisance for water pollution in states downstream from pollution sources. 
91 The first two decisions giving judicial review to EPA regulations interpreting the 
CWA did not mention judicial deference to the EPA's interpretation. Train v. Colo. Pub. 
Interest Research Group, 426 U.S. 1 (1976) (sustaining the EPA's interpretation); Train v. 
City of N.Y., 420 U.S. 35 (1975) (rejecting the EPA's interpretation). In the third such 
opinion, the Court looked first at the wording, structure, and legislative history of the 
CWA regarding the interpretation at issue. E.I. du Pont, 430 U.S. at 127-30. The Court 
went on to note that sections 101(d), 33 U.S.C. 5 1251(d) & 501(a), 33 U.S.C. 9 1361(a), 
charged the EPA with administering the CWA and promulgating regulations to implement 
it. E.I. du Pont, 430 U.S. at 132. Only then did the Court find the EPA's interpretation to 
be "'sufficiently reasonable to preclude the Court of Appeals from substituting its judg- 
ment for that of the Agency.'" Id. at 135 (quoting Train v. NRDC, 421 U.S. 60,87 (1975)). 
Not content with that justification, it also noted that the overwhelming majority of deci- 
sions of the courts of appeals and the "thorough, scholarly opinions written by some of our 
finest judges" supported the EPA's position. Id. at 135. The next such decision, Costle v. 
Pacific Legal Foundation, 445 U.S. 198 (1980), considered the EPA's procedural rules for 
permit issuance. The Court held that courts should accord administrative agencies defer- 
ence with regard to the details of their procedures as long as they met the minimum 
requirements of the Constitution, the Administrative Procedure Act, and the authorizing 
statutes. Id. at 212-215. In EPA v. National Crushed Stone Ass'n, 449 U.S. 64, 73-79 
(1989), the Court returned to the methodology of E.I. du Pont by thoroughly reviewing the 
wording, structure, and history of the statute. Only then did it hold that deference should 
be given to the EPA's "reasonable construction" of the CWA and found that the EPA's 
construction was reasonable. National Crushed Stone, 449 U.S. at 83-84. The Court's last 
judicial review of the EPA's regulations, in Chemical Manufacturers Ass'n v. NRDC, 470 
U.S. 116 (1985), is the first time it used the now standard doctrine of Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. 
v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984) (holding that if the statute is ambiguous, courts 
should defer to the interpretation of the agency designated by Congress to administer the 
statute, if that interpretation is reasonable). 
In Riverside Bayview, 474 U.S. at 131-35, the Court performed a Chevron analysis of the 
Corps of Engineers' interpretation of "navigable waters" in the Corps of Engineers's regu- 
lations, upholding them. In SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 168, the Court rejected another inter- 
pretation of "navigable waters" in the Corps of Engineers' regulations, giving no deference 
because the interpretation was of recent vintage and contrary to the Corps of Engineers' 
earlier interpretations. 
92 In Illinois v. Milwaukee, 451 U.S. 304,332 (1981), for instance, the Court held that the 
CWA pre-empted the federal common law of nuisance, without mentioning that the gov- 
ernment filed an amicus brief arguing that the federal common law of nuisance survived 
the CWA. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Illinois v. Milwaukee, 451 U.S. 
304 (1981) (NO. 79-408), 1980 WL 339512. 
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of a cross-cutting legal issue or by the nature of the parties before it 
than by its understanding of the statute and its purpose. It often 
fails to use or cite previous decisions that support its position or 
entirely disregards previous decisions that do not support its posi- 
tion. This reinforces Professor Lazarus' conclusion that the Court 
has no appreciation of "environmental law as a distinct area of the 
law" or "vision of the role of law in environmental p r~ tec t ion . "~~  
B. Does the Court Understand the Clean Water Act? 
With some ninety sections and over four hundred subsections, 
the CWA is a long and complex statute, covering some one hun- 
dred eighty pages in the United States Code.94 Understanding the 
statute, of course, does not require an intimate knowledge of all of 
its sections. California Board cited seventeen different sections in 
an attempt to sketch a comprehensive picture of the statute.95 The 
Court frequently cited California Board in subsequent CWA deci- 
sions as a shorthand guide to the statute.96 During the course of its 
twenty-three CWA decisions, the Court has decided issues under 
fifteen of the sections97 and cited thirty-two sections, covering the 
most important sections in the statute. But the Court cited only 
seven sections in the average decision, not a very comprehensive 
slice of the statute. The Court's often meager examination of only 
the CWA sections relevant to the cases before it suggests that it 
may have a less than total understanding of the statute. 
Compounding this, sixteen, or two-thirds of the Court's twenty- 
three CWA decisions, contain an analytical mistake or omission 
regarding the statute. In some, the Court missed a provision that 
would have helped its argument or conc l~s ion .~~  In others, it failed 
93 Lazarus, Thirty Years, supra note 2, at 3, 5. 
94 In the 2000 version of the United States Code the CWA covered pages 356-533. 
95 See infra Table B. 
96 Indeed, the Court cited EPA v. California ex rel. State Water Resources Control Board, 
426 U.S. 200 (1976), in nine of its twenty subsequent CWA decisions, more than it cited 
any other CWA decision in subsequent CWA opinions. See infra Table B. 
97 See in* Table B. 
98 In Train v. Colorado Public Interest Research Group, 426 U.S. 1,  4 (1976), environ- 
mental plaintiffs filed a CWA s 505 citizen suit in district court, seeking judicial review of 
EPA regulations exempting nuclear waste regulated under the Atomic Energy Act, 42 
U.S.C. $ 5  2011-2281, from the definition of "pollutant" under CWA 502(6), 33 U.S.C. 
5 1362(6). This exclusion effectively removed such nuclear waste from regulation by 
CWA's point source permit program. The Court upheld the EPA's action in an opinion 
reconciling the two statutes, Colorado Public Interest, 426 U.S. at 15-17. However, it could 
have accomplished the same end result more easily on jurisdictional grounds. CWA 
5 505(a)(2), 33 U.S.C. 5 1365(a)(2), authorizes mandamus actions in district courts against 
the EPA when it has not taken actions required of it by the CWA. But once the EPA has 
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to address a provision contrary to its argument or conclusion. 
While the unaddressed provisions were not necessarily fatal to the 
taken the actions, section 505 does not confer jurisdiction for judicial review in district 
courts or elsewhere. Colorado Public Interest, 426 U.S. at 15-17. CWA 8 509(b), 33 U.S.C. 
1369(b), authorizes judicial review of specified EPA actions in the courts of appeals, but 
EPA regulations of the type at issue are not among the listed actions. The Administrative 
Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 702, however, creates a cause of action for judicial review of 
such regulations, with federal question jurisdiction in the district courts under 28 U.S.C. 
1331. As a result, in Colorado Public Interest, plaintiffs commenced their actions in the 
right court, but under the wrong claim of jurisdiction, and could have been dismissed on 
jurisdictional grounds. However, there are important differences between citizen suit juris- 
diction and federal question jurisdiction. The former, for instance, provides attorney fee 
awards for successful plaintiffs, whereas the latter does not. 
In California Board, 426 U.S. at 213-14 (1976), states challenged the EPA's disapproval 
of state permit programs insofar as they applied to polluting federal facilities. Among 
other things, the states argued they could not effectively include their requirements in 
water pollution permits for federally owned water pollution sources unless states rather 
than the EPA issued permits to  them. The Court could have avoided its prolonged 
response to this argument simply by noting that CWA 401,33 U.S.C. 1341, authorized 
the states to require the EPA to include such state requirements in permits that it issued. 
In Crown Simpson Pulp Co. v. Costle, 445 U.S. 193, 196-97 (1980), the Court held that 
CWA 509(b), 33 U.S.C. 1369(b), granted authority to the courts of appeals for judicial 
review of EPA action vetoing the issuance, by a state with an EPA approved permit pro- 
gram, of a CWA § 402 permit although § 509(b) does not mention such authority. The 
Court did so because 509(b) granted the courts of appeals jurisdiction for judicial review 
of EPA denial of a permit. Crown Simpson, 445 U.S. at 196-97. The effects of the EPA 
denying a permit and vetoing a state issued permit are the same, and it is irrational to have 
the form of judicial review of EPA action regarding a permit differ depending on whether 
the EPA or a state is the permit issuer. Id. The Court found it particularly anomalous that 
such a bifurcation would result in slower review of the EPA's action with regard to  state 
issued permits than of the EPA's actions on its own permits. Id. The statutory undesirabil- 
ity of that anomaly is underscored by CWA § 101(b), 33 U.S.C. 5 1251(b), which states a 
congressional policy preference for state administration of the permit program. Curiously, 
the Court did not mention 101(b). 
In United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 257-60 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting), Justice 
Stevens argued in dissent that the criminal sanction for failing to report oil spills in 
3 311(b)(5), 33 U.S.C. 1321(b)(5), violated the Fifth Amendment's guarantee against 
self-incrimination. The majority could easily have responded to this argument, and Justice 
Stevens might not have made it, had they recognized the requirement from CWA 
§ 311(b)(5) was to "immediately" notify and that its purpose was to enable the government 
to  effectively contain and control oil spills. One factor in the effectiveness of spill response 
is how quickly the spill is responded to and one factor governing the speed of spill response 
is the time that passes before the government learns of the spill. Justice Stevens himself 
admitted that if the purpose of the requirement was "to assist the Government in its 
cleanup responsibilities," it was a permissible requirement. Ward, 448 U.S. at 259. 
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Court's arguments99 or its decisions,100 its failure to address them 
99 In Ward, 448 U.S. at 249-50, the Court acknowledged that one factor in determining 
whether the penalty for an oil spill under CWA 5 311(b)(6), 33 U.S.C. 9 1321(b)(6), is 
criminal or civil is whether oil spills are already criminal acts. It noted they were already 
criminal acts under the Refuse Act of 1899,33 U.S.C. 8 407. Ward, 448 U.S. at 250. While 
the Court discounted this factor, it failed to note that a negligent or knowing spill is also a 
criminal act under CWA 5 301(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) and 9 309(c), 33 U.S.C. 9 1319(c). 
The Court dealt with this factor without recognizing its full relevance by citing Helvering v. 
Mitchell, which stated that "Congress may impose both a criminal and a civil sanction in 
respect to the same act or omission." Ward, 448 U.S. at 250 (citing Helvering v. Mitchell, 
303 U.S. 391,399 (1938)). The government brief did not mention that the spill might have 
been a criminal act under 9 309(c) of the CWA. See Brief for the United States, United 
States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242 (1980) (No. 79-394), 1980 WL 339616. 
100 In Middlesex County Sewerage Commission v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 
U.S. 1, 22 (1981), the Court held that the CWA was so comprehensive that "the federal 
common law of nuisance in the area of water pollution is entirely pre-empted by the more 
comprehensive scope of the" (emphasis added) CWA. While this conclusion may be war- 
ranted for claims arising from point source pollution, it is not warranted for claims arising 
from non-point source pollution as implied by the Court's "entirely pre-empted" statement. 
Id. (emphasis added); See discussion infra pp. 143-146 and accompanying notes 106-121. 
Worse, the Court concluded that "the federal common law of nuisance has been fully pre- 
empted in the area of ocean pollution" by the CWA, despite the CWA's lack of jurisdiction 
over ocean pollution. Sea Clammers, 453 U.S. at 11 (emphasis added). Finally, the Court 
rejected a private cause of action for damages under 42 U.S.C. 5 1983 because the CWA 
and the Marine Protection, Resources and Sanctuaries Act, 33 U.S.C. 59 1401-1445 (1976), 
already authorized more limited private enforcement of statutory violations (without dam- 
ages) in their respective citizen suit provisions. Sea Clammers, 453 U.S. at 2021. The 
Court, however, entirely ignored the savings provision in CWA 5 505(e), 33 U.S.C. 
9 1365(e), stating that "[nlothing in this section shall restrict any right which any person . . . 
may have under any statute . . . ." Sea Clammers, 453 U.S. at 2021. 
In Department of Energy v. Ohio, 503 U.S. 607,618 (1992), the Court notes that 9 311,33 
U.S.C. § 1321, and 5 312, 33 U.S.C. Q 1322, of the CWA contain their own definitions of 
"person," which both include the United States. In contrast the general definition of "per- 
son" in § 502(5), 33 U.S.C. § 1362(5), does not include the United States. The Court offers 
this in support of its argument that when 9 505(a), 33 U.S.C. 5 1365(a), authorizes the 
assessment of civil penalties under 9 309(d), 33 U.S.C. 5 1319(d), against violators of the 
CWA, the inclusion of the United States among the "persons" who may be sued under 
9 505(a) does not carry over to the "persons" against whom civil penalties may be assessed 
under 9 309(d). See DOE, 503 U.S. at 619. The Court's argument is seriously undercut, 
however, by the fact that both 5 311 and 5 312 of the CWA are freestanding provisions for 
oil spills and marine sanitation devices which have their own definitional, standard setting, 
and enforcement authorities. In addition, they were enacted separately from and prior to 
the remainder of the CWA, they are not the basis for permit conditions under 5 402, and 
they are not enforceable under 5 309. Section 309 and section 505, on the other hand, are 
part of the woof and warp of the CWA's point source control program and in this instance 
are directly interrelated. That may not dispose of the Court's argument, but it certainly 
weakens the argument. 
In SWANCC, 531 U.S. 159,164-65 (2001), a local waste disposal agency challenged the 
Corps of Engineers' determination that isolated ponds, not alleged-to be connected or 
adjacent to navigable waters, were navigable because of their use "as habitat by.  . . migra- 
tory birds which cross state lines," under the so-called "migratory bird rule." The local 
agency argued isolated wetlands were not within the statutory definition of navigable 
waters, and, if they were, the assertion of jurisdiction exceeded Congress' authority to reg- 
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casts doubt on the Court's grasp of the statute. In some decisions, 
the Court did not fully understand the very provisions or concepts 
it was dealing with,lOl particularly the significance of the distinction 
ulate under the Commerce Clause of the Constitution. Id. at 165-66. A sharply divided 
Court held that isolated wetlands were not "navigable waters" as used in CWA 5 404, thus 
avoiding the constitutional issue. SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 174. The Court noted that Con- 
gress had unequivocally acquiesced in 1977 to the Corps of Engineers' amendment of its 
regulation to include wetlands adjacent to navigable waters, while Congress did not do so 
with the Corps of Engineers' subsequent amendment, the migratory bird rule. Id. at 167, 
169-70. The dissent found this logic disingenuous because the unequivocal acquiescence 
by Congress in 1977 was to the Corps of Engineers' interpretation that included both adja- 
cent and isolated wetlands. Id. at 184-86 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The Corps of Engineers' 
interim regulations in 1975 covered "non-navigable intrastate waters whose use or misuse 
could affect interstate commerce" and "wetlands that are not contiguous or adjacent to 
navigable waters." 40 Fed. Reg. 31,322, 31,325-26 (July 25, 1975). It promulgated its final 
regulation in 1977, including "isolated lakes and wetlands." 42 Fed. Reg. 37,127 (July 19, 
1977). The migratory bird rule appears merely to put a gloss on this. 
101 The Court in SWANCC admitted it had noted earlier in Riverside Bayview that "nav- 
igable" is of "limited import," for Congress intended to "regulate at least some waters that 
would not be deemed 'navigable' under the traditional understanding of that term." 
SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 167 (quoting Riverside Bayview, 474 U.S. at 133). The Court could 
not agree that Congress intended to read "navigable" out of the CWA. Id. at 172. It did so 
by focusing almost entirely on 9 404, rather than on the definition of "navigable water" in 
5 502(7) as the "waters of the United States." SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 172. The legislative 
history of that definition, including its abandonment of any notion of traditional navigabil- 
ity, suggests the Court was wrong in its statutory interpretation and should have addressed 
the constitutional issue. Prof. Lazarus suggests the Court might well have found isolated 
wetlands beyond the reach of Commerce Clause jurisdiction. Lazarus, Three Years, supra 
note 2, at 660-64. 
See Chem. Mfrs. Ass'n v. NRDC, 470 U.S. 116 (1985) (examining whether CWA 5 309(1), 
which forbid the EPA to  "modify" any requirement of 5 301 or § 307(b) for toxic pollu- 
tants, applies to "fundamentally different factor" (FDF) variances authorized by 5 301(n)). 
The Court, deferring to  the EPA's interpretation, held that it did not. Chemical Manufac- 
turers, 470 U.S. at 134. To do so, the Court first had to find that the term "modify" was 
ambiguous. To demonstrate that "modify" was ambiguous, the Court noted that 
5 307(a)(1) required revision of pretreatment standards from time to time to keep up with 
developing technology. Chemical Manufacturers, 470 U.S. at 125-26. This argument may 
have had some force if 5 307(b)(l) used the verb "modify" instead of "revise," but it did 
not. Why 5 307(b)(l) casts doubt on the meaning of "modify" in 5 301 is anyone's guess. 
Whatever its merits, the Court appears to  have taken the argument from the government's 
brief. Brief for the U.S. EPA at 14-18, Chemical Manufacturers, 470 U.S. 116 (Nos. 83- 
1013, 83-1373), 1984 WL 566007. 
The Court also noted that both parties agreed the EPA could promulgate a best availa- 
ble technology (BAT) effluent guideline for a single plant subcategory of an industry on 
the same basis that it could grant a FDF variance from a BAT effluent guideline. Chemical 
Manufacturers, 470 U.S. at 131. That being the case, the Court saw no difference between 
the two, other than a meaningless procedural formality. The procedural difference, how- 
ever, is significant. The EPA's promulgation of a BAT effluent guideline is done through a 
notice and comment rulemaking, which may be challenged in a court of appeals and gov- 
erns any like source. The EPA'S issuance of a permit is an adjudicatory process, is initially 
appealed administratively, and ultimately may be appealed to the court of appeals in the 
circuit where the plant is located. To get an FDF variance, the applicant must prove that 
its facility is very different in some respect from one of the factors the EPA studied in other 
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between point sources and non-point sources,lo2 water quality stan- 
dards,lo3 and the nature of state certification under CWA 9 401.1°4 
Finally, some of the Court's decisions are littered with errors and 
omissions. lo5 
1. The Point/Non-Point Source Distinction 
The CWA's overarching objective "is to restore and maintain the 
chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's 
waters. "Io6 The pollution load in the nation's waters is from both 
point sources and non-point sources, sometimes overwhelmingly 
from non-point sources.lo7 The statute created sophisticated and 
effective permit, surveillance, and enforcement systems to reduce 
point source pollution to a minimal level. However, it created no 
such program to deal with non-point source pollution. It did estab- 
lish a fund for grants to planning agencies to develop regional pol- 
lution control programs, including programs to deal with non-point 
sources,108 but that funding has long since ceased. In any event, 
none of the non-point source controls developed as a result of the 
program were federally enforceable. Thus, the CWA is not 
designed to reach its ambitious goal, but only to get part of the way 
there. Probably because the Court has never seen a non-point 
source case, it has never indicated an awareness of the significance 
of the point source verses non-point source distinction. and 
implications. 
Beginning with the Court's second CWA decision, Train v. Colo- 
rado Public Interest Research Group ("Colorado PIRG"),109 and . 
continuing with California Board, the Court viewed the CWA as 
regulating pollution from point sources, with a goal of eliminating 
facilities as the basis for its national guideline. In granting the variance, the EPA is really 
finding that the guideline does not apply to the facility and that the EPA must develop a 
technology-based standard for the facility on a one-time basis under CWA 9 402(a), 33 
U.S.C. 1342(a). This is not really modifying the effluent guideline, it is determining that 
the general standard is inapplicable. Brief for the U.S. EPA at 11, Chemical Manufactur- 
ers, 470 U.S. 116,470 U.S. 116 (1985) (Nos. 83-1013,83-1373), 1984 WL 566007. The Court 
could have reached the same result more consistently with the CWA had it understood the 
nature of an FDF variance. 
102 See discussion infra pp. 143-146 and accompanying notes 106-121. 
103 See discussion infra pp. 146-151 and accompanying notes 122-151. 
104 See discussion infra pp. 151-155 and accompanying notes 153-166. 
105 See discussion infra pp. 155-167 and accompanying notes 167-232. 
CWA 8 101(a), 33 U.S.C. 9 1251(a) (2000). 
107 Andreen, supra note 29, at 563-564; THE COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, 
! h ~  ANNUAL REPORT, pp. 118-19 (1978). 
108 CWA 208, 33 U.S.C. 8 1288 (2000). See literature cited infra note 33. 
'09 426 U.S. 1, 7 (1976). 
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the discharge of pollutants by 1985."O Later, in Costle v. Pacific 
Legal Foundation (PLF),lll the Court again recited the CWA's 
goal of eliminating the discharge of pollutants by 1985 and noted 
that the prohibition against adding pollutants to navigable waters 
from point sources without a permit in 9 301(a) was "one means of 
reaching that goal."l12 In neither decision did the Court note that 
the 1985 goal pertains only to point source discharges of pollution 
or that Congress created the 1985 goal as one means of achieving 
the overarching CWA objective of restoring and maintaining the 
integrity of the nation's waters. Both decisions treat the 1985 goal 
as the only CWA objective. Both decisions appear unaware that 
eliminating discharges by point sources could only partly achieve 
clean water and that even the zero discharge goal is purely aspira- 
tional; the CWA contains no requirement that point source dis- 
charges of pollutants cease by 1985. Indeed, the statute allows 
industrial dischargers until 1989 to achieve the second level of pol- 
lution control.l13 Although the statute requires the EPA to identify 
control measures available to eliminate the discharge of pollu- 
tants,'14 it does not require the EPA to adopt such measures as 
technology-based standards and does not require industry to 
achieve them.l15 Moreover, 9 301(a), and the permit program it 
engenders, is the only means the CWA provides to reach its over- 
arching objective or any of its water purity goals. 
Because Congress's failure to deal with non-point sources is pri- 
marily of policy significance and has little impact on the point 
110 426 U.S. 200,203 (1976) (citing CWA J 101(a)(l), 33 U.S.C. 5 1251(a)(l) which notes 
that the goal of the CWA is to eliminate "the discharge of pollutants into the navigable 
waters . . . by 1985"). Because CWA J 502(12), 33 U.S.C. J 1362(12), defines the phrases 
"discharge of a pollutant" and "discharge of pollutants" to mean "any addition of any 
pollutant to navigable waters from any point source," (emphasis added) the goal speaks 
only of discharges from point sources. 
111 445 U.S. 198 (1980). 
112 Id. at 202. 
113 CWA J 301(b), 33 U.S.C. J 1311(b)(E) (2000). While the 1972 version of the statute 
required industrial sources to achieve BAT by 1983, Federal Water Pollution Control Act 
of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, J 301(b), 86 Stat. 816, Congress in 1987 extended the BAT 
compliance date to 1989, Water Quality Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-4, 101 Stat. 7, 29-30, 
well after the 1985 goal for zero discharge. 
114 CWA 5 304(b)(3), 33 U.S.C. 5 1314(b)(3) (2000). 
11s The statute requires the EPA to develop technology-based standards reflecting the 
best available technology (BAT), 9 304(b)(2), 33 U.S.C. J 1314(b)(2) (2000), and the best 
conventional control technology (BCT), 5 304(b)(4), 33 U.S.C. J 1314(b)(4) (2000). In 
addition, CWA 9 301(b)(2), 33 U.S.C. 9 1311(b)(2) (2000), requires industrial dischargers 
to meet the 5 304(b)(2) and (4) levels of technology, but does not mention the measures 
for eliminating discharges of pollutants from 5 304(b)(3). 
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source regulatory program and the legal issues it raises,l16 the 
Court's failure to grasp the significance of the pointlnon-point 
source distinction was of no consequence in California Board or 
PLF. But the Court's decisions in Milwaukee v. Illinois (Milwau- 
kee 11)"' and Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea 
Clammers Ass'n (Sea Clarnmer~)' '~ may have obliterated the dis- 
tinction without the Court being aware of it. Because the Court 
believed that the CWA comprehensively addressed water pollu- 
tion, it concluded in Milwaukee I1 that the CWA displaced the fed- 
eral common law of nuisance. The Court qualified that conclusion 
as pertaining "at least so far as concerns the claims of respon- 
dents,"'lg which were point source ~ 1 a i m s . l ~ ~  This would have left 
the door open for the Court to conclude in an appropriate case that 
the CWA did not displace the federal common law of nuisance for 
non-point source pollution. Apparently unaware of the implica- 
tions of the distinction, the Court in Sea Clammers re-characterized 
its decision in Milwaukee II as holding that: "the federal common 
law of nuisance in the area of water pollution is entirely pre-empted 
by the more comprehensive scope of the [CWA]."12' HOW can the 
116 Congress's failure to legislate on this issue does have some impact. When both point 
and non-point sources contribute to a water body not achieving a water quality criterion, 
the permit-issuing agency must develop effluent limitations for the point source permits to 
achieve the criterion. The result is the statute places the burden of achieving water quality 
standards solely on point sources. Further, it means that when non-point source pollution 
must be reduced to achieve water quality standards, water quality standards will not be 
achieved. 
117 451 U.S. 304 (1981). 
118 453 U.S. 1 (1981). 
" 9  Milwaukee 11, 451 U.S. at 317. 
120 Id. at 319-20. 
121 Sea Clammers, 453 U.S. at  22 (emphasis added). Curiously, the Court also held that 
damage claims based on the pollution-induced collapse of ocean fisheries were "fully pre- 
empted [by the CWA] in the area of ocean pollution." Id. at 11. The jurisdiction of the 
CWA, however, extends to the territorial seas, not to the ocean. CWA 5 502(7)-(8), 33 
U.S.C. 5 1362(7)-(8). Not acknowledging this, the Court nevertheless commented that if 
ocean waters are not within the jurisdiction of the CWA, they are covered by the Marine 
Protection, Research and Sanctuaries Act of 1972 (MPRSA), 33 U.S.C. 55 1401-1445 
(1976). Sea Clammers, 453 U.S. at 22. The Court stated "we see no cause for different 
treatment for the pre-emption question[;] . . . [tlhe regulatory scheme of the MPRSA is no 
less comprehensive, with respect to ocean pollution, than are other analogous provisions" 
of the CWA. Id. A quick glance comparing the CWA and MPRSA suggests this is not so. 
MPRSA's twenty-two sections, seventy-seven subsections, and twenty-three pages in the 
U.S. Code (pp. 533-56 in the 2000 edition), are dwarfed by the CWA's ninety sections, 
over four-hundred subsections, and one-hundred-eighty pages in the U.S. Code (pp. 
356-533 in the 2000 edition). MPRSA regulates only waste sent from the United States to 
be dumped at sea and U.S. flagships (excluding war ships) dumping waste at sea. 33 U.S.C. 
8 1401 (2000). It does not address pollution from the operation of vessels. pollution 
originating from land, pollution originating from non-U.S. flag ships unless they are dump- 
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CWA pre-empt the federal common law of nuisance for non-point 
source pollution, when the CWA does not regulate non-point 
source pollution? While this misperception did not affect the out- 
come of these two decisions concerning point source pollution, it 
could negatively affect subsequent cases concerning non-point 
source pollution. 
2. Water Quality Standards 
The Court also has a shaky understanding of water quality stan- 
dards. It began well enough in California Board, recognizing that 
the water quality strategy of earlier legislation had failed because it 
focused "on tolerable effects rather than preventable causes . . . 
awkwardly shared federal and state responsibility . . . and . . . cum- 
brous enforcement procedures."122 However, the decision did not 
deal with water quality standards and did not suggest that the 
Court actually knew what water quality standards are and how 
they are implemented. Later, in International Paper Co. v. Ouel- 
lette ( O ~ e l l e t t e ) ~ ~ ~  the Court confused water quality standards and 
technology-based standards. It observed that the EPA issues per- 
mits "according to established effluent standards [referring to what 
this article describes as technology-based standards] and water 
quality standards, that in turn are based upon available technol- 
~ g y , " ' ~ ~  and that if a state imposed its own standards "it also must 
consider the technological feasibility of more stringent controls. ,7125 
Water quality standards are not based on available technology and 
the CWA does not require states to consider technological feasibil- 
ity in establishing their standards.126 The only authority the Court 
cites for these startling propositions is CWA § 302, 33 U.S.C. 
3 1312, which simply does not support them.127 
ing waste originating in the United States, or  pollution from structures other than vessels, 
such as oil platforms. 
122 426 U.S. 200, 202 (1976). 
123 479 U.S. 481 (1987). 
124 Id. at 494. 
125 Id. at 495. 
126 The water quality standards section, CWA 5 303, 33 U.S.C. 5 1313 (2000), does not 
even hint that water quality standards should look to the availability or  feasibility of tech- 
nology, nor does § 304(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1314(a) (2000), which directs the EPA to issue 
guidelines for states on how to  develop water quality standards, particularly water quality 
criteria. 
127 CWA 5 302,33 U.S.C. § 1312 (2000), authorizes the EPA to issue permits with efflu- 
ent limitations sufficient to achieve BAT and B C I  technology-based requirements, but 
without more stringent effluent limitations to achieve water quality standards if the costs of 
going beyond BAT or BCT greatly outweigh the benefits. It can d o  so only with the con- 
currence of the state. 33 U.S.C. § 1312(b)(2)(A). It cannot do so for more than one period 
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When the Court did deal with water quality standards, in Arkan- 
sas v. Oklahoma ( O k l a h ~ m a ) , ~ ~ ~  it described them more accu- 
rately, but fumbled when it came to the details. Its biggest mistake 
was to indicate that the "primary means for enforcing [water qual- 
ity standards] is the NPDES [permit program], enacted in 1972."lZ9 
This wording is unfortunate. Water quality standards are devel- 
oped under CWA sections 303 and 304130 to form the basis of efflu- 
ent limitations in permits. The CWA enforcement section is 
directed at violations of permits, not at violations of water quality 
standards.131 Thus permits may achieve water quality standards by 
incorporating effluent limitations calculated to do so, but permits 
do not enforce water quality standards. Stating that water quality 
standards are enforceable suggests that enforcers may sue dis- 
chargers for violating water quality standards, regardless of 
whether the discharges violate effluent limitations in permits. This 
suggestion is reinforced by the Court's statement that permits are 
the primary means of enforcing water quality standards-indicat- 
ing that there are other means of enforcing them.132 Finally, the 
Court continues that 9 303(d) "allocate[s] the burden of reducing 
undesirable discharges between existing sources and new 
sources."133 But 5 303(d) does not mention allocating the pollution 
reduction needed to meet water quality standards among new and 
existing ~ 0 u r c e s . l ~ ~  The Court's misstatement of 5 303(d) supports 
of five years with regard to toxic pollutants. 33 U.S.C. 1312(b)(2)(A). The section cited 
by the Court contains no limitation on state authority to require more stringent require- 
ments. Furthermore, CWA 9 401, 33 U.S.C. $9 1341, and § 510, 33 U.S.C. § 1370, reserve 
the authority of states to require more stringent standards, with no condition that they be 
technologically feasible. 
128 503 U.S. 91 (1992). 
129 Id. at 101 (emphasis added). 
130 33 U.S.C. $5 1313-1314. 
131 CWA 5 309(a)(l), 33 U.S.C. 1319(a)(l) (2000), and § 309(a)(3), 33 U.S.C. 
5 1319(a)(3) (2000), authorize the EPA enforcement against violations of listed statutory 
sections (not including the water quality standards sections, CWA $9 303-304, 33 U.S.C. 
$0 1313-1314 (2000)) and permit conditions. 
132 Oklahoma, 503 U.S. at 101. 
133 Id. at 108. 
134 CWA 5 303(d)(l)-(3), 33 U.S.C. 1313(d)(l)-(3) (2000), only require developing 
the total maximum daily load of pollutants a water-body can carry without exceeding water 
quality standards; they do not require allocating the reduction of any excess to particular 
pollution sources. CWA 303(d)(4), 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(4) (2000), however, provides that 
if a water-body does not meet water quality standards, a "waste load allocation established 
under this section" may not be revised unless one of two conditions is met. It is unlikely 
that an allocation would have been established for a source that did not exist when the 
allocation was made, making it unlikely that allocations would have been made between 
existing and new sources. However, the statutes suggest the opposite; CWA § 303(e), 33 
U.S.C. §$ 1313(e) (2000), and § 304(1), 33 U.S.C. 1314(1) (2000), address the development 
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the Court's conclusion that the CWA allows new sources to dis- 
charge into waters not meeting water quality standards.13' But it 
could have reached the same result without the m i ~ s t a t e r n e n t . ~ ~ ~  
In PUD No. 1 of Jefferson County v. Washington Department of 
Ecology (PUD No. 1)13' the Court again started down the right 
path. It noted that 5 303, 33 U.S.C. 9 1313, requires states, with 
EPA approval, to "institute comprehensive water quality stan- 
d a r d ~ . " ' ~ ~  And it noted, no less than three times, that under CWA 
5 303(c)(2)(A) water quality standards consist of designated uses 
for a water body and criteria to support those uses.139 But it then 
repeats and compounds its earlier misstatement by saying "[sltates 
are responsible for enforcing water quality standards on intrastate 
waters," citing CWA 9 309(a).140 The next sentence reinforces the 
error: "[iln addition to these primary enforcement responsibili- 
ties . . . . "141 Since the Court cites 5 309, the EPA enforcement 
section, it evidently means enforcement, rather than implementa- 
tion, of water quality standards. However, 5 309(a) authorizes 
EPA enforcement, not state en f0 r~ement . l~~  Moreover, 9 309 says 
nothing about enforcing water quality standards. Finally, 5 309 
does not withhold from the EPA the authority to enforce violations 
related to water quality standards on intrastate waters. Indeed, the 
of effluent limitations in permits based on water quality standards which require allocation. 
CWA 5 303(e)(3)(A), 33 U.S.C. 5 1313(e)(3)(A) (2000), requires states to submit planning 
processes to the EPA that will assure "effluent limitations. . . at least as stringent as those 
required by . . . any applicable water quality standard in effect." Again, it is not apparent 
how a state could develop and submit an effluent limitation for a point source that did not 
yet exist. CWA 5 304(1)(1)(C), 33 U.S.C. 5 1314(1)(1)(C), is more explicit, requiring states 
to submit individual control strategies to meet water quality standards for "point sources 
discharging any toxic pollutant" (emphasis added). The present tense verb suggests that 
allocations are to be made for presently operating point sources. 
135 Oklahoma, 503 U.S. at 108. 
136 The EPA had found that the new discharge would result in a theoretical but non- 
detectable impact on water quality at the state line, but the EPA had interpreted the CWA 
not to require denial of the permit because of such impact. The Court could have deferred 
to the agency's interpretation of the statute in this regard. 
I37 511 U.S. 700 (1994). 
138 Id. at 704. 
139 Id. at 704, 714. 
I4O Id. at 707 (citing CWA 5 309(a), 33 U.S.C 5 1319(a) (emphasis added)). 
141 Id. at 707 (emphasis added). 
142 The Court may have been referring to the notice the EPA is to give the state in 
advance of a federal enforcement action under CWA 5 309(a)(l), 33 U.S.C. 5 1319(a)(l), 
but this does not authorize state enforcement. Indeed, its only direction for the EPA is to 
enforce if the state does not enforce. While the implication is that if the state does enforce, 
the EPA should refrain from doing so, the EPA is not obliged to defer to state action, for 
the EPA can enforce under CWA 5 309(a)(3), 33 U.S.C. 5 1314(a)(3), without giving the 
state prior notice. 
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statute does not distinguish between interstate and intrastate 
waters for either water quality standards or enforcement purposes. 
In addition to its mistake on enforcement, the Court states that the 
EPA establishes technology-based standards, while the states 
establish, implement, and enforce water quality standards.143 This 
ignores the delicate pas de deux Congress established between the 
EPA and states in establishing water quality standards, in which the 
EPA plays important and critical r01es.l~~ 
PUD No.1 arose in the context of a CWA 3 401, 33 U.S.C. 
8 1341, state certification. Section 401 requires the applicant for a 
federal license or permit resulting in a discharge to navigable water 
to secure from the state in which the discharge will occur a certifi- 
cation that it will meet applicable federal and state water pollution 
control requirements. The applicant in the case proposed to build 
a hydroelectric project. The state had designated the water quality 
use for the river in question as salmon propagation. The state 
included in its 3 401 certification a condition that the hydroelectric 
facility only withdraw from the river an amount of water that 
would leave a designated minimum flow in the river calculated to 
be sufficient for fish propagation. 
Implementing water quality standards is normally a four step 
process: 1) designating a use for the water body, 2) developing cri- 
teria (usually numeric) for the maximum loading of a pollutant 
allowed in the water body to assure it is safe for the designated use, 
3) determining the maximum daily load of the pollutant that can be 
present without violating the criteria, and 4) allocating among dis- 
chargers to the water body the burden of eliminating any of the 
pollutant in excess of the maximum daily load. The parties in this 
143 PUD NO. 1, 511 U.S. at 704. 
1" States designate uses of water bodies, although the EPA must approve them. How- 
ever, Congress directed the EPA to develop water quality criteria. CWA § 304(a), 33 
U.S.C. 3 1314(a) (2000). The EPA has developed criteria for a range of pollutants and 
water conditions that may be applied with various use designations. See Environmental 
Protection Agency Water Quality Standards Database, http:llwww.epa.govlwqsdatabasel 
(last visited Nov. 21, 2005). The EPA's regulations governing the review and approval of 
state water quality standards indicate that the EPA will approve a state criterion for which 
there is a federal criterion only if the state criterion is identical to the federal criterion or if 
the state demonstrates that the difference is scientifically justified. 40 C.F.R. 3 131.11(b) 
(2002). Congress directed the EPA to establish water quality standards for states if the 
EPA determines that a state has not established their own water quality standards that 
meet the CWA's requirements. CWA $9 303(b), 303(c)(4), and 304(1)(3), 33 U.S.C. 
$5 1313(b), 1313(c)(4), and 1314(1)(3) (2000). When the EPA issues a permit under 5 402, 
33 U.S.C. 1342 (2000), it uses water quality standards as a basis for effluent limitations. 
In addition, when the EPA enforces against violations of a permit's effluent limitations, the 
limitations may be based on water quality standards. 
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case and the Justices became embroiled in a dispute over whether 
the state's procedure in PUD No.1 was in accordance with this 
four-step process for implementing water quality standards. Peti- 
tioners and the minority argued that permit conditions must be 
based on criteria, while the minimum flow requirement was based 
on the designated use.145 The Court ultimately decided that permit 
conditions could be based on designated uses.14" But the dispute 
was groundless. None of the parties or Justices recognized that the 
state had followed the normal procedure. It designated a use for 
the river, established flow as a criterion necessary to assure the 
designated use, and allocated all of the burden for maintaining that 
minimum flow to the power plant. The only irregularity here.was 
that the state did not submit the flow criterion to the EPA for 
appr0va1.l~~ 
These misperceptions about water quality standards were not 
critical to the Court's decision in PUD No. 1; the Court could have 
reached the same conclusions based on a better understanding of 
the statutory scheme.148 Its misapplication of "enforcement" to 
water quality standards, however, again suggests they can be 
enforced without being translated into a permit effluent limita- 
t i ~ n . ~ ~ ~  This runs counter to the strategy of the statute in two 
regards. First, compliance with a permit is compliance with the 
statute for most When the EPA issues the permit, the 
145 PUD NO. 1, 511 U.S. at 714. 
146 Id. at 717-18. 
14' Although CWA 5 303(d)(2), 33 U.S.C. 5 1313(d)(2) (2000), requires states to submit 
their water quality uses and criteria to the EPA for approval, CWA 5 510,33 U.S.C. 5 1360 
(2000), also preserves the rights of the states to have water pollution controls more strin- 
gent than federal requirements. In the absence of EPA approval of the flow criterion, the 
state's flow limitation is more stringent than federal requirements. Query whether flow is 
a legitimate criterion; criteria normally are pollutants. The EPA routinely limits flow as an 
effluent limitation in permits, although effluent limitations are normally for pollutants as 
well. For instruction in how flow limitations are used in permits, see OFFICE OF WATER, 
U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA-833-B-96-003, U.S. EPA NPDES PERMIT WRITERS' 
GUIDE (1998). 
148 The enforceability of water quality standards, except as used to develop conditions in 
a permit, had nothing to do with the issue before the Court. The question of whether 
permit conditions can be based on uses rather than criteria is a red herring. Flow is used 
here as a criterion. The real question is whether the state can use that criterion if the EPA 
has not approved it; CWA 9 510,33 U.S.C. 5 1370 (2000), (preserving the states' authority 
to have water pollution requirements more stringent than the federal requirements) sug- 
gests that it can. 
149 Northwest Envtl. Advocates v. City of Portland, 56 F.3d 979, 987 (9th Cir. 1995) 
(stating that "Congress intended to confer citizens standing to enforce water quality stan- 
dards" (citing PUD No. 1,  511 U.S. at 714-22). 
I50 CWA Q 402(k), 33 U.S.C. 5 1342(k) (2000). 
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government, the discharger and the public come to closure on what 
water pollution control is expected of the discharger, who is not to 
be faced thereafter with different or additional requirements until 
the permit is modified or reissued. Second, the courts are not to be 
left enforcing indefinite requirements, as they were when the fed- 
eral common law of nuisance held sway.151 If enforcers may sue 
dischargers for violating water quality standards before the admin- 
istrative agencies have completed the four-step process for devel- 
oping conditions in permits necessary to achieve water quality 
standards-thus determining what water quality standards demand 
from the particular discharger-the courts must complete that pro- 
cess and make that determination. Courts have no expeitise for 
that task, and therefore, Congress has assigned that task to the 
administrative agencies. 
3. Section 401 State Certification 
The Court also misunderstands CWA 5 401,33 U.S.C. 5 1341. In 
California Board, states challenged the EPA's disapproval of state 
permit programs insofar as they applied to federally owned water 
pollution ~ 0 u r c e s . l ~ ~  Among other things, the states argued they 
could not effectively include their requirements in water pollution 
permits for federally owned sources unless states with approved 
permit programs issued permits to those sources. The Court could 
have avoided a protracted analysis153 simply by noting that CWA 
5 401 authorized states to require the EPA to include state require- 
ments in permits that the EPA issues. The Court was aware of 
9 401; indeed, it cited the section,154 but it evidently did not know 
how to use it. The government's brief may have misled the Court 
in this regard.155 
151 As the Court observed in Milwaukee II, "Congress has not left the formulation of 
appropriate federal standards to the courts through application of often vague and indeter- 
minate nuisance concepts and maxims of equity jurisprudence, but rather has occupied the 
field through the establishment of a comprehensive regulatory program supervised by an 
expert administrative agency." 451 U.S. 304, 317 (1981). Similarly, the Senate Report for 
the 1972 legislation commented that citizen suits would not substitute a 'common law' or  
court-developed definition of water quality. An alleged violation of an effluent control 
limitation or standard, would not require reanalysis of technological. . . [or] other consid- 
erations at the enforcement stage. These matters will have been settled in the administra- 
tive procedure leading to the establishment of such effluent control provision. 
S. Rep. No. 92-414, at 79 (1971). 
152 EPA v. Cal. ex rel. State Water Res. Control Bd., 426 U.S. 200 (1976). 
153 Id. at 211-27. 
154 Id. at 227 n.42. 
155 Brief for the United States at 33, California Board, 426 U.S. 200 (No. 74-1435), 1975 
WL 173540 (stating that 5 401 provides "no federal agency 'shall be deemed to be an appli- 
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cant for the purposes of' Section 401(a); in short, unlike other pollutant sources, federal 
facilities are not to be subject to state certification . . . . See Section 401(a)(6)"). The 
quoted language does not exist in 9 401(a)(6) or  elsewhere in the section. If it did, it would 
merely reiterate that 9 401(a) places the responsibility for obtaining a 1 401 certification on 
the applicant for a federal permit, rather than on the federal permit issuing agency. It does 
not alter that allocation of responsibility when the permit applicant is a federal facility. 
The government argued that "when Congress had the opportunity to subject federal 
facilities to state control" it refused to do so. Brief for the United States at 33, California 
Board, 426 U.S. 200 (No. 74-1435), 1975 WL 173540. The main supports for that argument 
were the exclusions for federal facilities from the EPA's authority to: first, delegate to 
states enforcement of new source standards to states, CWA 9 306(c), 33 U.S.C. 9 1316(c); 
and second, authorize state inspection and monitoring by states, CWA 9 308(c), 33 U.S.C. 
5 1318 (c). These curious provisions were apparently copied from the Clean Air Act 
("CAA") without considering their appropriateness in the CWA. The initial version of the 
CAA in 1970 did not establish a federal permit system which qualified states could admin- 
ister upon EPA approval. The CWA, of course, did establish such a permitting system. 
Although the Court interpreted the CWA initially to preempt states with approved pro- 
grams from issuing permits to federal facilities, as noted in California Board, 426 U.S. at 
215-16, Congress soon amended the statute to make it clear states with approved programs 
were authorized to do so. See CWA 9 313(a)(2)(A), 33 U.S.C. 9 1323(a)(2)(A). How are 
states to issue permits to federal new sources without applying the new source standards 
required by the CWA consistently with 9 306(c), 33 U.SC. 9 1316(c)? On its face, there 
appears to be no need for delegating the EPA's inspection authority in CWA 9 308, 33 
U.S.C. 9 1318, to states. States have their own statutory inspection authorities and the 
state authorities must be comparable to the federal authorities for the EPA to approve a 
state permit program. CWA Q 401(b)(2)(B), 33 U.S.C. 9 1341(b)(2)(B). On the other 
hand, the waiver of sovereign immunity in CWA 9 313,33 U.S.C. 9 1323, does not include 
a waiver for state inspections. Perhaps CWA 9 308(c), 33 U.S.C. 9 1318(c), is a waiver of 
sovereign immunity if the EPA approves a state inspection program. This is the only possi- 
ble interpretation that would lead a state to secure the EPA's approval for such a program. 
The EPA has never promulgated procedures for states to  secure such approval. In any 
event, the specific exclusion of federal facilities from approved state programs in approved 
state 9 306 and 9 308 programs cuts against the government's argument that 9 401 does not 
include state certification for federal facilities when 9 401 contains no specific exclusion for 
federal facilities. 
The government's secondary support was the provision in 9 401(a)(6) that a federal 
agency not "be deemed to be an applicant for the purpose of 9 401(a)," depriving states the 
authority to certify conditions in permits issued to federal facilities. Brief for the United 
States at 33, California Board, 426 U.S. 200 (No. 74-1435), 1975 WL 173540. The brief 
implies that the purpose of CWA 9 401 is for states to certify that 9 402 permits meet 
federal standards, not mentioning that it applies to  permits issued under all federal stat- 
utes, not just under CWA § 402, or  that states are also to certify that applicants meet the 
requirements of state law. Id. CWA 9 401(a) requires the applicant for a federal permit, 
not the federal permitting authority, to secure the state certification. Taken in context, the 
passage in CWA 9 401(a)(6) that the government quotes in its brief merely reiterates that 
the onus is not on the federal permit issuing agency but on the permit applicant to apply 
for a state certification. Accepting the government's main argument that Congress did not 
intend in CWA Q 313, 33 U.S.C. 8 1323, to waive federal sovereign immunity for states to 
issue permits to federal facilities, Congress clearly did intend to waive sovereign immunity 
for the application of appropriate state laws to federal facilities, which the government 
admits in its brief. Id. at 15-16. Interpreting 9 313 to exempt federal facilities from 9 401 
certifications makes no sense, for it robs states of their only opportunity to assert those 
state laws. 
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In California Board, the Court merely failed to use CWA $ 401. 
In PUD No. 1, the only opinion interpreting the section, the Court 
misunderstood it. CWA $ 401(a) requires applicants for federal 
licenses and permits involving a discharge to navigable water to 
secure from the state in which the discharge originates a certifica- 
tion that it will meet federal and state water pollution require- 
ments. Subsection (d) authorizes the certifying state to set forth 
effluent and other limitations necessary to assure the applicant will 
meet the requirements of the CWA and other appropriate state 
laws. The certificate conditions must become conditions of the fed- 
eral permit. The first major issue in PUD No. 1 was whether condi- 
tions in a $ 401 certification must relate to the discharge resulting 
in $ 401 jurisdiction or may be related to non-discharge aspects of 
the permit.lS6 
The hydroelectric project had two discharges: the discharge into 
a river of material to construct a dam and the post-construction 
discharge into the river of water that had been diverted from the 
river to generate electricity.lS7 The certification condition had 
nothing to do with either discharge; instead, it specified the amount 
of water that had to remain in the river between the diversion of 
water to generate electricity and its return to the river.lS8 In 
essence, this was a condition on intake rather than discharge, i.e., 
no water may be withdrawn from the river that would reduce its 
flow below the minimum necessary to sustain the propagation of 
fish. 
Subsection 401(a) requires license or permit applicants to secure 
certifications that "any such discharge will comply," while $ 401(d) 
authorizes a certification "to set forth any effluent limitations and 
other limitations . . . necessary to assure that any applicant. . . will 
comply" (emphasis added). The dissent points out the logical 
implication that if only discharges require certifications, certifica- 
tions may impose conditions only on discharges. The Court, how- 
ever, held that (a) was $ 401's jurisdictional provision, establishing 
the type of activities that required the applicant to secure a certifi- 
cation, while (d) was its implementing provision, establishing the 
type of conditions states could impose on applicants in 
certifications.lS9 
156 PUD NO. 1 of Jefferson County v. Wash. Dept. of Ecology, 511 U.S. 700, 708-11 
(1994). 
157 Id. at 711. 
1% Id. at 709-11. 
159 Id. at 711-14. 
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While the Court's interpretation appears to hang together, it 
ignores two important aspects of 9 401. First, Congress initially 
enacted 9 401(a) without 9 401(d).160 Did the Court assume that 
the section could not be implemented until Congress added 
9 401(d)? On the contrary, from the outset 9 401 provided that no 
federal license or permit requiring certification can issue unless the 
state grants a certification or waives its right to certify. This meant 
that if an applicant did not comply with a relevant requirement, no 
certification could be made and no permit could issue, even though 
an applicant not then meeting a requirement could come into com- 
pliance if given a reasonable compliance schedule. That fully 
implemented 9 401(a). Under the amended provision, a state 
could include in its certification a condition that an applicant, not 
then in compliance, come into compliance with the required stan- 
dard within a reasonable time. While the addition of 5 401(d) 
makes it easier for applicants to obtain 9 401 certifications, the 
Court interpreted it to expand states' authority to include certifica- 
tion conditions not related to the discharge. Nothing in the legisla- 
tive history of either the original 9 401 in 1970 or the addition of 
9 401(d) in 1972 hints that Congress thought 9 401 was unimple- 
mented as initially enacted, or intended 9 401 (d) to implement the 
remainder of the section. Finally, the scant legislative history sug- 
gests that Congress intended 9 401(d) to relate to  discharge^.'^^ 
Second, both 9 401(a) and (d) list specific sections of the statute 
for which the state is to certify compliance and develop conditions 
required for compliance. The first sentence of 9 401(a) requires 
the state to certify that the discharge will comply with sections 301, 
302, 303, 306, and 307.162 All of these sections relate to dis- 
160 Congress initially enacted 401(a) in the Water and Environmental Quality 
Improvement Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-244,84 Stat. 91,107-10, designating it as § 21(b) 
in 103. In 1972, Congress redesignated 5 21(b) as 5 401 and added 5 401(d), Federal 
Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500. 86 Stat. 816, 
877-80. 
161 The chief sponsor of the 1972 legislation commented that "Sections 401 and 402 pro- 
vide for controls over discharges." 117 CONG. REC. 38,797, 38,855 (1971) (statement of 
Sen. Muskie). The Senate Report saw little change in the 1970 legislation by the 1972 
amendments. "This is substantially § 21(b) of existing law . . . amended to assure the bill's 
changed emphasis from water quality standards to effluent limitations." S. REP. NO. 92- 
414, at 69 (1971). It evidently considered the addition of 402(d) to flesh out the earlier 
part of the section. "Existing law is further modified by section 401 of this bill to include a 
definition of certification." Id. The EPA did not see a significant change either. "Section 
401 is essentially the same as the present section 21(b)." H. REP. NO. 92-911, at 165 (1972). 
162 33 U.S.C. 80 1311-1313,1316 and 1317 (2000). 
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charges.'63 Subsection (d) omits 9 303 (relating to water quality 
standards) from its list but adds "any other appropriate require- 
ment of state law." This raises two issues. First, could it mean that 
8 401(a) requires denial of a permit to a source presently out of 
compliance with water quality standard-based requirements, with- 
out the possibility of a § 401(d) condition that it come into compli- 
ance with those requirements? That would undercut 5 401(d)'s 
effect of making it easier for permit applicants to obtain certifica- 
tions. .It also appears to be contrary to the scant legislative his- 
tory.164 Second, what is an "other appropriate requirement of state 
law" in 8 401(d)? That is a potentially open-ended field.165 The 
easiest answer to both questions is that water quality standards 
developed under § 303 and "appropriate requirements of state 
law" are the same thing. This allows states to issue certifications to 
sources not presently meeting water quality standard requirements 
by conditioning permits on meeting them with a reasonable com- 
pliance schedule. It also bounds a potentially open-ended field of 
state requirements. In any event, sections 301, 302, 303, 306 and 
307 all define effluent limitations for point source discharges. The 
familiar cannon of statutory interpretation, ejustem generis, sug- 
gests that the last of five items in a list be read as similar to the 
preceding four items,166 i.e., that "appropriate requirement of state 
law" also be read as relating to discharges. 
4. Multiple Mistakes and Omissions 
The interpretive errors discussed above involve the most difficult 
concepts in the CWA, those revolving around water quality stan- 
dards and one of the more arcane concepts in the statute, state 
certification. If the Court had trouble with them, it is not surpris- 
163 CWA Q 301, 33 U.S.C. Q 1311, establishes effluent limitations to be met by point 
source discharges. CWA Q 302, 33 U.S.C. Q 1312 (2000), authorizes variances for point 
source discharges. CWA 9 303, 33 U.S.C. Q 1313 (2000), establishes water quality stan- 
dards, but the only place the CWA uses them is in determining effluent limitations for 
point source permits in Q 301(b)(l)(C), 33 U.S.C. Q 1311(b)(l)(C) (2000). CWA Q 306,33 
U.S.C. Q 1316 (2000), establishes performance standards for new point source discharges. 
CWA Q 307, 33 U.S.C. Q 1317 (2000), authorizes toxic discharge standards for point source 
discharges and pretreatment standards for industries discharging into municipal sewage 
treatment point source discharges. 
164 "[A] state may attach to any Federally issued license or permit such conditions as 
may be necessary to assure compliance with water quality standards in that state." 117 
CONG. REC. 33,692, 33,698 (1972). 
165 In American Rivers Inc., v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 129 F.3d 99, 103 
(2nd Cir. 1997), for instance, the state certification required construction of a fish passage, 
a canoe portage, and both minimum and maximum flow rates. 
See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION, 323 (1994). 
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ing. But they are not the only provisions of the CWA that the 
Court m i s u n d e r ~ t o o d . ~ ~ ~  More disturbing are decisions in which 
the Court made multiple errors in construing the statute. Wein- 
berger v. Romero-Barcelo (Romero-Barce10)l~~ and Gwaltney of 
Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation ( G ~ a l t n e y ) ~ ~ ~  are 
the primary examples of this. Although Sea C l a m m e r ~ l ~ ~  and 
Dague171 made serious errors, they did not make multiple errors. 
Moreover, Dague did not butcher the statute directly as did the 
other decisions, but it is based on such a self-serving fantasy it is 
worth n~ t ing . "~  
167 See supra notes 98-101. 
168 456 U.S. 305 (1982). 
169 484 U.S. 49 (1987). 
170 Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. Nat'l Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 64 (1989). 
171 City of Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557 (1992). 
172 In Dague the Court held that the award of costs "(including reasonable attorney . . . 
fees)" to successful citizen suit plaintiffs under 5 505(d), 33 U.S.C. 5 1365(d), is to be calcu- 
lated by multiplying reasonable hours spent on the case by reasonable hourly rates, with no 
enhancement for success. Dague, 505 U.S. at 561-62. The argument for an enhancement 
for success is that it compensates for time spent on unsuccessful cases, for which no fee 
awards are authorized. This is similar to contingent fee arrangements for plaintiffs' attor- 
neys in torts cases. 
The Court did not examine the words o r  structure of the statute or determine the legisla- 
tive intent behind the "reasonable attorney's fees" language found in CWA 5 505(d), 33 
U.S.C. 5 1365(d). The Court did not even take into account the American Rule that each 
party pays its own attorney fees or  the Court's own gloss that statutory departures from 
this rule should be interpreted narrowly. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 
421 U.S. 240, 269-71 (1975). Instead, the Court constructed an opinion based on fantasy 
economics of legal practice. The opinion began reasonably enough by acknowledging the 
two common types of attorney fee arrangements. Dague, 505 U.S. at 560-61. The first is 
the lodestar fee arrangement, used by most defense lawyers and lawyers engaged in non- 
litigation matters. In lodestar arrangements, hours spent on the matter are multiplied by 
the lawyer's hourly rate without regard to outcome. The second is the contingent fee 
arrangement, which is used by most plaintiffs' lawyers, especially in tort cases. In contin- 
gent fee arrangements, lawyers are paid an agreed upon percentage of the award in suc- 
cessful cases and are not paid in unsuccessful cases. 
The Court notes that enhancement of lodestar fees is meant to compensate for risk of 
loss. Id. at 562. It posits that risk is a product of "(1) the legal and factual merits of the 
claim, and (2) the difficulty of establishing those merits." Id. Because these two factors 
are closely related, it is not apparent how they can be multiplied. That aside, the Court 
assumes, with no authority, that the second factor is already calculated into the lodestar, 
either in the hourly rate charged or the number of hours spent. If that assumption were 
true, to enhance the lodestar for risk would be duplicative. This, of course, addresses only 
lodestar fees, not contingent fees. But even with lodestar fees, it is pure fantasy. Attor- 
neys using the lodestar fee arrangement establish their hourly rates based on experience or 
prominence in the field, not by the difficulty of the case. Moreover, the hours spent on a 
case are more related to the number and complexity of legal or factual issues than to risk 
of loss. The Court's articulated concern was that lodestar enhancement in successful cases 
would encourage counsel to accept unmeritorious cases. Id. at 563. That fear, however, is 
purely theoretical and does not take into account real world variables: lawyers may lose 
meritorious cases; fee awards in successful cases are discretionary; and judges may disallow 
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In Romero-Barcelo the Court held that the CWA citizen suit 
provision did not require courts to issue injunctions immediately 
restraining violations, but left the courts to their traditional equita- 
ble discretion to fashion appropriate relief.173 The Governor of 
Puerto Rico sued the Secretary of Defense to enjoin practice 
bombing by the Navy into the ocean adjacent to an island off the 
coast of Puerto Rico, adding pollutants (bombs) to navigable water 
(the ocean) from point sources (airplanes) without a CWA per- 
mit.174 The trial court held that the Navy violated the CWA, found 
that the violations caused no harm to water quality, refused to 
immediately enjoin the bombing, and ordered the Navy to immedi- 
ately apply for a CWA permit.175 In affirming the trial court's 
injunction, the Court rested its opinion on: 1) interpreting the EPA 
enforcement provision rather than the citizen suit provision at issue 
in the case, 2) repeatedly misinterpreting or ignoring CWA provi- 
sions, 3) misrepresenting legislative history, and 4) ignoring its 
characterizations of the CWA in its earlier opinions.176 Moreover, 
as the dissent notes, it mischaracterizes the appellate court's opin- 
ion as the "premise for its essay on equitable discretion."177 The 
Court's opinion might simply reflect the maxim that bad facts 
make bad law. The opinion might also reflect the Court's discom- 
fort with its then recent decision in TVA v. Hill17* that because sec- 
portions of fees if they determine that there were unsuccessful or  unnecessary excursions 
from successful parts of the case. Furthermore, judges may impose sanctions on lawyers 
for presenting cases that judges determine are without merit. 
The dissent had no trouble determining that the legislative intent of the fee-shifting pro- 
vision of the citizen suit provision was to ensure "private persons seeking to enforce [envi- 
ronmental] laws could retain competent counsel." Id. at 568 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
The dissent recognized that many plaintiffs in such cases could not afford counsel that 
charged normal hourly rates in lodestar arrangements. It also recognized that most citizen 
suit cases did not involve large money damages paid to  successful plaintiffs, making contin- 
gent fee arrangements unattractive for attorneys in those cases. It correctly concluded that 
only a lodestar with an enhancement for success would encourage competent counsel to 
accept these cases. 
173 Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. at 306. 
174 Id. at 307-08. 
I75 Id. at 308-12. 
176 Id. at 311-20. 
177 Id. at 322 (Stevens, J., dissenting). As Justice Stevens pointed out, contrary to the 
Court's description, the appellate court "did not hold that the District Court had no discre- 
tion in formulating remedies for statutory violations." Id. at 324. Instead, the Court of 
Appeals held that the District Court was not free to deny an injunction-by authorizing a 
presidential exemption in 9 313(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1323(a), for national security purposes- 
where the violation of the statute was blatant and not merely technical and the violator's 
"predicament was foreseen and accommodated by Congress" Id. at 324-25. 
178 437 U.S. 153 (1978). 
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tion 7 of the Endangered Species Act (ESA)179 contained a flat 
prohibition on the destruction of critical habitats of endangered 
species, the trial court had no choice but to enjoin operation of the 
TVA's Tellico Dam because it would destroy the sole habitat of the 
endangered snail darter. It might also reflect the fact that the 
Department of Justice was defending the Secretary of Defense as a 
violator of the CWA rather than advocating for the Administrator 
of the EPA as the implementer and enforcer of the CWA.180 
The Court's main challenge in Romero-Barcelo was to distin- 
guish TVA v. Hill. To do so, it had to demonstrate that the ESA 
directed courts to enjoin violations while the CWA did not. The 
Court got no help from the citizen suit provisions of the two stat- 
utes, under which the plaintiffs in the cases sued, because the pro- 
visions in both are virtually identical.181 Instead, the Court 
examined the purposes and prohibitions of the two statutes as they 
relate to the two cases. The Court stated that the purpose of the 
ESA is to preserve endangered species and the only way to protect 
the snail darter was to enjoin operation of the Tellico Dam. By 
contrast, the Court stated that the goal of the CWA is clean water 
and the CWA may be enforced with either civil penalties or crimi- 
nal fines.18' This is an apples to oranges comparison. Moreover, it 
is flawed. The Court implies that injunctive relief was the only 
enforcement remedy available under the ESA while other options 
were available under the CWA. However, the ESA authorizes 
enforcement by civil penalties and criminal fines just as the CWA 
does.ls3 Furthermore, the plaintiff could not have used civil penal- 
ties or criminal fines as enforcement mechanisms under either stat- 
ute. The statutes simply do not authorize private citizens, even 
governors, to initiate federal criminal prosecutions. Additionally, 
the Court has held that there is no waiver of sovereign immunity 
by the United States for the assessment of civil penalties for viola- 
tions of the CWA by federal fa~i1ities.l~~ 
179 16 U.S.C. 5 1536. 
I* The author first developed this analysis of Romero-Barcelo in JEFFERY G .  MILLER, 
THE LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION (Sheldon Novick ed., Clark Board- 
man 1987) § 8.01 (8)(b)(iii). 
181 See ESA 5 ll(g)(l), 16 U.S.C. 5 1540(g)(l), and CWA 8 505(a), 33 U.S.C. 5 1365(a). 
Both statutes authorize courts to "enforce" the statutes, although the ESA's provision 
authorizes citizens to commence actions to "enjoin" violations of the statute. 
182 Romero-Bnrcelo, 456 U.S. at 314. The Court used the phrase "fines and criminal 
penalties" rather than the usual nomenclature of fines for criminal sanctions and penalties 
for civil sanctions. 
183 ESA 5 ll(a)-(b), 16 U.S.C. 5 1540(a)-(b). 
la United States Dep't of Energy v. Ohio, 503 U.S. 607 (1992). 
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To be sure, the prohibitory injunction was necessary in TVA v. 
Hill to accomplish the purpose of the ESA, the preservation of an 
endangered species, while a prohibitory injunction was not neces- 
sary in Romero-Barcelo to accomplish the purpose of the CWA, 
the preservation of water quality, because the trial court found that 
the practice bombing did not adversely affect water quality. The 
decisions do not reflect differences between the statutes; they 
reflect a difference in the facts. While the bombing with no permit 
may not have disturbed water quality, it thumbed its nose at the 
basic prohibition of the CWA and was an affront to the CWA's 
permit system. The Court dismissed this concern with a terse 
"[tlhe integrity of the Nation's waters . . . not the permit process, is 
the purpose of the" CWA.lS5 While this is undoubtedly true, it 
ignores the centrality of the permit system in achieving the integ- 
rity of the Nation's waters, a centrality critical to the Court's analy- 
sis and outcome in other CWA decisions.186 As the dissent in 
Romero-Barcelo points out, the effect of the decision, in essence, is 
to allow courts to amend the basic prohibition of the statute by 
authorizing particular discharges to continue without permits.Is7 
Moreover, it does so when courts find that the discharges do not 
adversely affect water quality, a determination Congress commit- 
ted to the EPA and its state counterparts rather than to courts.188 
The Court also reasoned that judicial discretion in granting 
injunctions is consistent with the structure of the statute, finding 
support in the sequential requirements that industry achieve BPT 
in 1977 and BAT in 1983 coupled with the goal of eliminating the 
discharge of pollutants by 1985.Is9 The Court concluded that 
"[tlhis scheme of phased compliance further suggests that this is a 
18s Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. at 314. 
186 The Court first noted the centrality of the permit system in achieving the CWA's 
purpose in EPA v. California ex ref. State Water Resources Control Board, 426 U.S. 200 
(1976). In Milwaukee II ,  the Court found the CWA, as manifested in the permit system, so 
comprehensively addressed water pollution that it preempted the operation of a federal 
common law of nuisance in interstate water pollution. Illinois v. Milwaukee, 451 U.S. 304 
(1981). Finally, in Ouellette, the Court found the CWA preempted the common law of 
nuisance of states affected by water pollution originating in other states, because it would 
interfere with the administration of the CWA's permit system. Int'l Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 
479 U.S. 481 (1987). 
'87 456 U.S. at 323. 
18s The permit writer is to include in permits effluent limitations sufficient to achieve 
water quality standards. CWA 5 301(b)(l)(B), 33 U.S.C. 5 1311(b)(l)(B). The state is to 
certify what permit conditions will achieve water quality standards. CWA 5 401,33 U.S.C. 
5 1341. 
'89 Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. at 316-17 (discussing CWA 5 301(b), 33 U.S.C. 
55 1311(b)). 
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statute in which Congress envisioned, rather than curtailed, the 
exercise of d iscre t i~n ." '~~  Another non sequitur. Congress did not 
include one bit of discretion in its requirements that industry 
achieve BPT by 1977 or BAT by 1983, and it did not incorporate its 
zero discharge objective by 1985 into any requirement of the stat- 
ute. Indeed, the Court acknowledged that it had held "some stan- 
dards related to phased compliance" to be absolute, citing EPA v. 
National Crushed Stone Ass'n ("Crushed Stone").lY1 While Con- 
gress granted EPA some discretion to vary these deadlines,19* it did 
not grant courts the discretion to do so, a distinction acknowledged 
by the Court in an earlier action.lY3 
The Court next posits that a wording difference between two 
EPA injunctive authorities, CWA sections 309 and 504, evidence 
retention of traditional judicial equitable discretion to issue injunc- 
tions under section 309. The Court does not explain how these two 
EPA authorities govern injunctive relief in citizen suits. Worse, the 
distinction the Court makes between sections 309 and 504 simply 
does not exist. The Court observes that section 504 "directs . . . 
EPA to seek an injunction to restrain immediately discharges of 
pollutants [it] finds to be presenting 'an imminent and substantial 
endangerment.' The Court then notes that 8 504 "is limited to 
the indicated class of violations" while other types of violations are 
addressed by 8 309(b), which authorizes EPA to seek "appropriate 
relief, including a permanent or temporary injunction."195 "The 
provision makes clear that Congress did not anticipate that all dis- 
chargers would be immediately enjoined."196 However, in 9 504, 
190 Id. at 316. 
191 Id. at 316 n.11 (citing EPA v. Nat'l Crushed Stone Ass'n., 449 U.S. 64 (1980)). 
192 Congress granted the EPA discretion to extend the date for achieving BAT under 
some circumstances in CWA $0 301(c) and 302, 33 U.S.C. $0  1311(c) and 1312. Similarly, 
when the 1977 deadline for BPT passed with some dischargers failing to comply through no 
fault of their own, Congress granted the EPA discretion to extend the compliance deadline 
to dischargers meeting specified factors in CWA 00  301(i) and 309(a)(5)(B), 33 U.S.C. 
$5 1311(i) and 1319(a)(5)(B). 
193 Republic Steel Corp. v. Costle, 434 U.S. 1030 (1978). The EPA vetoed a state-issued 
permit because it allowed compliance with BPT after 1977. The Sixth Circuit overturned 
the EPA's veto as improper. On appeal by the EPA, the Court remanded the case to the 
Sixth Circuit to be reconsidered in light of a recent amendment to the CWA, giving the 
EPA discretion to extend the deadline in consideration of specified factors, implying that 
Congress gave the EPA, not courts, discretion to extend the deadline. The Sixth Circuit 
ultimately reversed itself, holding that the 1977 deadline could not be extended by courts. 
Republic Steel Corp. v. Costle, 581 F.2d 1228 (6th Cir. 1978). 
194 Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. at 317. 
195 Id. (emphasis added) 
196 Id. at 317-18. 
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Congress merely provided that the EPA "may bring suit . . . to 
immediately restrain" an endangerment.19' Congressional use of 
"may" authorizes the EPA to seek an injunction; it does not man- 
date that it do so. Also, it does not require the court to grant one. 
Moreover, 5 504 authority does not arise when a statutory violation 
causes an endangerment, as the Court stated, but rather whenever 
water pollution causes an endangerment, regardless of whether it 
violates the CWA. 
The final piece of evidence that the Court adduced was that the 
Senate Report for the 1972 Amendments indicated the "enforce- 
ment procedures" of the CWA were drawn extensively from the 
"enforcement provisions of the Refuse Act of 1899" and that 
"[v]iolations of the Refuse Act have not automatically led courts to 
issue  injunction^."'^^ There are four problems with this argument. 
First, the quoted language from the Senate Report discussed the 
CWA's EPA enforcement provisions in 9 309, not the CWA citizen 
suit provision in $ 505, under which the Romero-Barcelo case was 
filed and decided. Second, the Refuse Act of 1899 provided 
enforcement remedies for the government, not for citizens, while 
Romero-Barcelo was a citizen suit. Third, the Refuse Act cases the 
Court cited all post-dated the 1972 CWA amendments; thus, the 
proposition that injunctions were not automatic under the Refuse 
Act was not before Congress when it enacted the CWA.lg9 Finally, 
the proposition for which the Court cited the Senate Report simply 
was not in the Senate Report.zoo 
The opinion's penultimate paragraph states: 
197 CWA 5 504, 33 U.S.C 5 1364 (emphasis added). 
198 Id .  at 319 (citing S. REP. NO. 92-414, at 62 (1971)). 
'99 Id.  (citing Reserve Mining Co. v. EPA, 514 F.2d 492 (8th Cir. 1975), U.S. v. Rohm & 
Haas Co.. 500 F.2d 167 (5th Cir. 1974), and U.S. v. Kennebec Log Driving Co., 491 F.2d 
572 (1st Cir. 1973)). 
2" The Court quoted the Senate Report as saying "[i]n writing the enforcement proce- 
dures involving the Federal Government the Committee drew extensively . . . upon the 
existing enforcement provisions of the Refuse Act of 1899." Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. at 
319. The Report actually says that the Committee based the EPA's enforcement provision 
in the CWA on the Refuse Act and the EPA's enforcement provision in the then recently 
enacted Clean Air Act. S. REP. NO. 92-414, at 63 (1971). Neither The Refuse Act nor the 
CAA specified that courts had discretion in issuing injunctions. Moreover, there was a 
significant difference between the enforcement provisions of the CAA and the Refuse Act. 
The CAA authorized the EPA to enforce only if it gave notice of its intent to the state 
thirty days in advance and the violation continued beyond the thirtieth day with the state 
taking no action. Clean Air Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 5 113(a), 84 Stat. 
1676, (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 5 7413(a)). The Refuse Act had no such notice 
requirement. See 33 U.S.C. 5 407. Read in context, the Senate Committee Report indi- 
cates that it relied on the Refuse Act to give the EPA authority in the CWA to enforce 
without the prior notice required under the CAA. Nowhere in the quoted portion of the 
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[tlhe District Court did not face a situation in which a per- 
mit would very likely not issue, and the requirements and 
objective of the statute could therefore not be vindicated if 
discharges were permitted to continue. Should it become 
clear that no permit will be issued and that compliance with 
the [CWA] will not be forthcoming, the statutory scheme 
and purpose would require the court to reconsider the bal- 
ance it had stru~k.~" 
This rescues the Court's decision, if not its reasoning. Ulti- 
mately, courts must require compliance with the CWA; if they do 
not, they effectively amend it, violating separation of powers 
principles.202 
Taken as a whole, the Court's opinion suggests that when an 
injunction is sought to require compliance with a federal statute, 
courts have an obligation to require compliance with the statute, 
but have considerable discretion in how they achieve that end. 
That is not a startling proposition. The perplexing question is why 
the Court so mangled the CWA to get this conclusion. The proba- 
ble answer is that the United States suggested all of the misinter- 
pretations of the CWA in its brief.203 Why would the EPA suggest 
such blatant misinterpretations of a statute it administers creating 
misinterpretations that could come back to haunt it? The answer is 
that the EPA did not and probably would not. The Department of 
the Navy was a party to the brief with the Solicitor General while 
the EPA was not. Congress entrusted the EPA, not the Depart- 
- - - - - 
Senate Report is there a suggestion that courts have discretion in issuing injunctions. See 
S. REP. NO. 92-414, at 63-65 (1971). 
201 Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. at 320. 
202 The Court implied as much in its remand of Republic Steel Corp. v. Costle, 434 U.S. 
1030 (1978). See also Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Train, 544 F.2d 657 (3rd Cir. 1976). 
203 "The different result in TVA v. Hill was due to the specific characteristics of the stat- 
ute and the factual situation there before the Court" Brief for Petitioner United States at 
11, Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305 (No. 80-1990), 1981 WL 390223 (emphasis added). 
Unfortunately, page 12 in the original document is missing. However, on page 13, the brief 
explained the factual differences between the two cases. Presumably the brief gave the 
Court its template for the legal differences. "The Act sets out a . . . phased system of 
pollution abatement . . . [Rlemedial flexibility will sometimes be needed to avoid unneces- 
sary hardship." Id. at 16. "Congress . . . provided for a phased program . . . [i]t is entirely 
consistent with this statutory scheme for the district courts to provide for some flexibility in 
the timing of compliance." Id. at 19. The brief also contrasted enforcement under CWA 
sections 309 and 504 on page 15, note 16. It accurately rephrased and quoted Q 504 without 
making the same mistakes as the Court. Id. at 15-16. Furthermore, the brief suggested 
that the Senate Report indicated that CWA Q 309 was based on the Refuse Act of 1899 and 
the injunctions were not automatic under the Refuse Act. Id. at 16. In support of this 
proposition the brief cited the same post-1972 Refuse Act decisions cited by the Court. See 
supra note 200. 
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ment of the Navy, or the Solicitor General, with interpreting and 
implementing the CWA. The problem here is that the United 
States was a defendant in a CWA enforcement action, making all 
of the arguments a defendant would ordinarily make, regardless of 
their implications for the integrity of the statute that it administers 
as a plaintiff in an enforcement action or as a defendant in a judi- 
cial review action.204 
Six years later, the Court in Gwaltney held that CWA 
O 505(a)(1)205 limited citizen suits to violations that are continuing 
or likely to recur.206 The first and primary justification for this 
holding is the plain meaning of the present tense verbal phrase "to 
be in violation."207 The Court reasoned that by using a present 
tense verb, Congress intended to authorize citizen suits for existing 
violations and not for wholly past violations.208 The Court bol- 
stered this argument by observing that Congress used the present 
tense throughout 5 505.209 It observed that the citizen suit provi- 
sions of most other environmental statutes also used the present 
tense verbs, demonstrating a consistent legislative intent that citi- 
zens could sue only for continuing violations.210 Finally, it noted 
that when Congress wanted to authorize citizens to sue for wholly 
past violations, it knew how to use language that explicitly "targets 
wholly past violations."211 The examples the Court used to support 
this assertion are not persuasive.212 Nevertheless, had the Court 
204 Michael Herz & Neal Devins, The Consequences of Department of Justice Control of 
Litigation on Agencies' Programs, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 1345 (2000). 
205 33 U.S.C. 5 1365(a)(1) (authorizing a suit against any person who is alleged "to be in 
violation" of the CWA). 
206 Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49 (1987). 
207 Id. at 49, 57. 
208 Id. at 57. 
209 Id. at 59-60. 
210 Id. at 57. 
211 Id. 
212 The Court cited the citizen suit provision of the Resource, Conservation and Recov- 
ery Act, 42 U.S.C. 5 6972(a)(l)(B), authorizing citizens to sue for abatement of present or 
future endangerments caused by past or present handling of hazardous waste. Gwaltney, 
484 U.S. at 57. This provision does not target wholly past violations, as suggested by the 
Court. Id. Instead it authorizes suits to abate endangerments, not violations, and the 
endangerments do not have to be caused by violations. The word "violate" and its deriva- 
tives occur nowhere in the subparagraph. Moreover, the provision authorizes suits to 
abate present or future endangerments, not wholly past endangerments. The Court also 
cited EPA authority to assess administrative penalties against a person who "has violated" 
the CWA in § 309(g). Id. at 58. Of course, this is an EPA enforcement provision, not a 
citizen suit provision. Moreover, the Court interpreted EPA's enforcement authority to 
reach wholly past and continuing violations, regardless of the tense Congress used in 5 309, 
undercutting the Court's argument that the present tense in 5 505 is limited to continuing 
violations. See infra note 213. 
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stopped there, its analysis would have been unexceptional and not 
Unfortunately, the Court continued with three sub- 
sidiary arguments that are faulty and destructive of citizen suits.214 
The Court's first subsidiary argument is that the purpose of the 
requirement that citizens give a violator notice of their intent to 
sue sixty days before filing suit215 is to give the violator the oppor- 
tunity to avoid suit by coming into compliance, a purpose that 
would not be served if citizens could sue for wholly past viola- 
t i o n ~ . ~ ~ ~  But the provision requires citizens to give notice to the 
EPA, the state, and the violator. Notice to the various govern- 
ments has nothing to do with allowing the violator to avoid suit by 
coming into compliance. The legislative history suggests the pur- 
pose of prior notice is to provide government prosecutors the first 
chance to enforce obviating the need for a citizen suit, not to allow 
the violator an opportunity to avoid Indeed, giving prior 
notice to a violator serves several purposes whether its alleged vio- 
213 The Court's holding that citizen suits are limited to continuing violations, based on 
the present tense of "alleged to be in violation," Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 57, presents a prob- 
lem in that Congress also used the phrase "is in violation" in CWA 9 309(a), the EPA 
enforcement section. Is the EPA also barred from enforcing against wholly past viola- 
tions? Plaintiffs in Gwaltney argued that it is "little questioned" that the EPA may d o  so. 
Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 58. The Court apparently agreed. Id. The Court distinguished the 
two situations, by noting that 9 309 authorized injunctions and penalties in separate subsec- 
tions, while 5 505 authorized them in the same sentence, making them independent reme- 
dies in 9 309 and "intertwined" in 5 505. Id. at 58-59. Since injunctions are not warranted 
for wholly past violations and injunctions and penalties are intertwined in citizen suits, the 
Court reasoned, both injunctions and penalties are appropriate only for continuing viola- 
tions in citizen suits. Id. at 58. While this argument seems metaphysical, the Court based 
its opinion in Tull v. United States on this basis. 481 U.S. 412,425 (1987). However, in Tull 
the Court made a distinction in the context of the role of the judge and jury in EPA 
enforcement actions. Id. Does the Court in Gwaltney suggest the role of the judge and 
jury are different depending on whether the EPA or citizens bring an enforcement action? 
Nothing in Gwaltney or Tull suggests that conclusion. 
214 The author first developed this analysis in Jeffrey G. Miller, Theme and Variations in 
Statutory Preclusions Against Successive Environmental Enforcement Actions by EPA and 
Citizens Part One: Statutory Bars in Citizen Suit Provisions, 28 HARV. ENVTL. L. h v .  401, 
484-91 (2004). 
215 CWA 9 505(b)(l)(A), 33 U.S.C. 9 1365(b)(l)(A). 
216 484 U.S. 59-60. 
217 The citizen suit provisions of the CWA and other environmental statutes were 
modeled on the CAA citizen suit provision and courts commonly resort to the legislative 
history of the latter to  inform the former. Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at  62; United States Dep't of 
Energy v. Ohio, 503 U.S. 607, 615 (1992). The notice and delay provision in the CAA 
citizen suit provision originated in the Senate bill and the Senate Report accompanying 
that bill explained that the notice "should motivate government agencies . . . to bring 
enforcement and abatement proceedings." S. REP. NO. 91-1196, at 36-37 (1970), reprinted 
in 1 CLEAN AIR A c r  LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 436-37 (1974). The Senate Committee 
intended the thirty-day prior notice to "further encourage and provide for agency enforce- 
ment," giving the government "an opportunity to act on the alleged violation." Id. at 437. 
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lations are present or wholly past. In either case it allows the viola- 
tor to convince the citizen enforcer that the alleged violations did 
not or do not exist, that they were not or are not serious, or that 
they have ceased or soon will cease, making a lawsuit pointless. 
Even if the violator fails to dissuade a citizen from filing suit, the 
notice affords the violator the opportunity to begin negotiating a 
settlement, sparing itself and the courts prolonged litigation. 
While the Court's first subsidiary argument is not as convincing 
as its plain meaning analysis, its second subsidiary argument is seri- 
ously flawed and has had a pernicious effect on citizen suit juris- 
prudence. The focus of this argument is that citizen suits 
"supplement rather than . . . supplant government action"218 and 
the citizen suit provision should not be interpreted to change the 
"nature of the citizen's role from interstitial to potentially intru- 
~ i v e . " ~ ~ ~  The Court's contrast between the meanings of "supple- 
ment" and "supplant" implies a linguistic precision that does not 
exist. According to the Court, citizen suits are to "supplement" 
government enforcement. "Supplement" means "to add to."220 
Citizen enforcers add to government enforcers. A citizen action 
cannot add to a government action unless the government has 
taken an action; if the government has not taken an action, there is 
nothing for the citizen suit to add to. But $ 505(b)(l)(B) bars the 
citizen suit if the government has already taken an enforcement 
action in "Supplant" means "to take the place of."222 If 
the government does not take an enforcement action against a vio- 
lation and a citizen does so, has not the citizen suit taken the place 
of a government action? The distinction the Court makes between 
"supplement" and "supplant," in the context of citizen suits, does 
not support its characterization of citizen suits as secondary 
enforcement mechanisms. 
The Court's observation that the citizen suit provision should not 
be interpreted to allow intrusion on government enforcement 
218 Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at  60. 
219 Id. at 61. The Court had commented in Sea Clammers that the EPA enforcement 
authority is "supplemented" by the citizen suit provision. Middlesex County Sewerage 
Auth. v. Nat'l Sea Clammers Ass'n 453 U.S. 1,14 (1981). However, the Court in Gwaltney 
did not cite Sea Clammers as precedent in this regard. This suggests an engrained view of 
citizen enforcement by the Court. As the dissent in Sea Clammers commented, the Court 
"has been more and more reluctant to open the courthouse door to the injured citizen." 
Id. at 25 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
220 WEBSTERS'S SEVENTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 884 (1999). 
221 The extent of this bar is not entirely settled. See Miller? supra note 214, at 426-28. 
222 WEBSTERS'S SEVENTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 884 (1999). 
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ignores the very nature of citizen suits. A citizen suit notice may 
cause the government to enforce when it otherwise would not 
have. When the government does commence a civil action against 
a violation in federal court, the citizen suit provision authorizes cit- 
izens to intervene in the government's action.223 The citizen suit 
provision allows citizens to second-guess the government's 
prosecutorial decisions: decisions not to enforce and decisions to 
enforce administratively rather than judicially. These outcomes 
may be intrusive, but are they not what Congress intended? 
Finally, the Court's conclusion that citizen suits for present viola- 
tions supplement government action and do not intrude on it, while 
citizen suits for wholly past violations supplant government action 
and do intrude on it, is simply a non sequitur. Citizens suits have 
the same effect on government enforcement actions whether the 
violations at issue are present or wholly past. While the Court's 
second subsidiary argument does not hold together logically or on 
its face, the evidence the Court offers to support it is little short of 
outrageous: a mischaracterized piece of legislative history;224 an 
223 CWA 5 505(b)(l)(B), 33 U.S.C. 5 1365(b)(l)(B). 
223 The Court quoted from the Senate Report accompanying the enactment of the 
CWA: "[tlhe Senate Report noted that '[tlhe Committee intends the great volume of 
enforcement actions [to] be brought by the State,' and that citizen suits are proper only 'if 
the Federal, State, and local agencies fail to exercise their enforcement responsibility."' 
Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 60 (quoting S. REP. NO. 92-414, at 64 (1971), reprinted in 2 A LEGIS- 
LATIVE HISTORY OF THE WATER POLLUTION CONTROL A a  AMENDMENTS OF 1972 1482 
(1973)) (emphasis added). The Court uses the two quoted fragments of the Report as if 
they are linked and they explain congressional intent regarding citizen suits. In fact, they 
aredrawn from different paragraphs and are parts of the Committee's comments on the 
EPA's enforcement provision, CWA 9: 309, rather than on the citizen suit provision, CWA 
9: 505. The two paragraphs read: 
The Committee . . . notes that the [enforcement] authority of the Federal Government 
should be used judiciously by the Administrator in those cases deserve [sic] Federal action 
because of their national character, scope, or seriousness. The Committee intends the 
great volume of enforcement actions be brought by the State. It is clear that the Adminis- 
trator is not to establish an enforcement bureaucracy but rather to  reserve his authority for 
the cases of paramount interest. 
It should be noted that if the Federal, State, and local agencies fail to exercise their 
enforcement responsibility, the public is provided the right to seek vigorous enforcement 
action under the citizen suit provisions of section 505. 
S. REP. NO. 92-414, at 64 (1971), reprinted in 2 A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE WATER 
POLLUTION CONTROL ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1972 1482 (1973). The first paragraph pro- 
vides congressional intent regarding the relationship between federal and state enforce- 
ment, not that citizen suits supplement rather than supplant government enforcement. The 
second paragraph does not state or imply that citizen suits are proper only if the various 
governments fail to exercise their enforcement responsibilities. Neither paragraph sug- 
gests that citizen suits are appropriate against continuing but not against wholly past 
violations. 
Heinonline - -  24 Va. Envtl. L.J. 169 2005-2006 
170 Virginia Environmental Law Journal [Vol. 24:125 
illogical deduction from that evidence;225 and an illogical 
hypothetical. 
To illustrate the parade of horribles that would ensue if citizens 
were allowed to sue for wholly past violations, the Court poses a 
hypothetical in which a violator agrees with the EPA to install 
unusually expensive and advanced pollution control equipment, 
not only bringing the violator into compliance, but protecting the 
environment far beyond the applicable legal requirement. In con- 
sideration for this action, the EPA agrees not to seek penalties. 
The Court concluded that "[ilf citizens could file suit months or 
years later, in order to seek civil penalties that the Administrator 
chose to forgo, then the Administrator's discretion to enforce the 
Act in the public interest would be curtailed ~ons ide rab ly . "~~~  This 
hypothetical does not support the distinction between citizen suits 
for continuing and wholly past violations for several reasons. 
First, the Court's argument is misdirected. By enacting CWA 
$ 505, Congress curtailed the government's ability to assure a viola- 
tor that it would not be the subject of enforcement. The proper 
question is whether Congress curtailed this for wholly past viola- 
tions. Second, the hypothetical is a red herring. Reported citizen 
suit cases simply do not reveal citizens suing in such a situation.227 
Third, if the violator spent more on its pollution control equipment 
than would normally have been required, it in essence came into 
compliance and paid a penalty in the amount of its extra costs. A 
court assessing a penalty in a subsequent citizen suit could offset 
this amount against the penalty it assesses in the citizen suit, as a 
matter which "justice may require," one of the factors courts are to 
consider in assessing penalties.228 Fourth, the interference by the 
citizen suit with the government's promise not to impose penalties 
is the same whether the suit involves continuing or wholly past vio- 
lations. Fifth, the hypothetical falls apart by simply altering the 
hypothetical to reflect a possible scenario in which the government 
225 The Court does not explain why citizen suits for wholly past violations undermine the 
supplementary role of citizen enforcement, while citizen suits against continuing violations 
do not. 
226 Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 61. 
227 None of the 125 citizen suit cases surveyed in the article and cited in Miller, supra 
note 215, resemble this fact pattern. 
228 CWA 5 309(d), 33 U.S.C. 5 1319(d). See Public Interest Research Group, Inc. v. Her- 
cules, Inc., 830 F .  Supp. 1525, 1538-40 (D.N.J. 1993), rev'd on other grounds, 50 F.3d 1239 
(3rd Cir. 1995), in which plaintiffs seeking penalties in a citizen suit argued the court, in 
assessing penalties, should take into account penalties the defendant had already paid to 
the government. 
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agrees to forego penalties in consideration for the violator install- 
ing pollution control equipment that is cheap, outmoded, barely 
complies with the permit's current requirements, under-performs 
equipment used by the rest of the industry, and is destined to fail in 
the near future. Does a citizen suit in that situation offend the 
structure or policy of the statute? 
Sixth, allowing citizen suits in the situation posed by the Court 
does not undercut the government's ability to settle cases on terms 
it deems favorable. In the Court's situation, the government got 
the benefit of its bargain and the citizen suit does not disturb that 
result. If the citizens succeed in having a court assess penalties, 
they are paid to the Treasury and the government is doubly bene- 
fited. If the government fears that this example will discourage 
other violators from entering into settlements with it, the govern- 
ment has sufficiently greater authority than citizen enforcers.229 As 
a result, violators failing to deal with the government do so at their 
peril. Finally, if the government wants to insulate a violator from a 
citizen suit, Congress has provided it can do so by embodying the 
settlement in a consent decree entered a federal court.230 
While the holding in Gwaltney may be justified on plain English 
grounds, it is not justified by the Court's other arguments. Yet 
these arguments, particularly the characterization of citizen suits as 
of secondary importance, have haunted subsequent citizen suits 
and been cited by court after court as justification for negative citi- 
zen suit The decision evidences either an extremely 
sloppy job of statutory interpretation or an unstated desire to close 
the courthouse door to injured citizens.232 
229 For example, the government may prosecute violators criminally via CWA 5 309(c), 
33 U.S.C. 5 1319 (2000); it may inspect violating facilities daily via CWA 5 308, 33 U.S.C. 
5 1318 (2000); it may terminate a violator's permit via CWA 5 402(b)(l)(C), 33 U.S.C. 
5 1342(b)(l)(C) (2000) (incorporated into the EPA's authority by CWA 5 402(a)(3)); or it 
may bar a violator from receiving government grants or contracts via CWA 5 507, 33 U. 
S.C. 5 1367 (2000). 
230 Under CWA $505(b)(l)(B), 33 U.S.C. 5 1365(b)(l)(B) (2000), government actions 
in court do foreclose citizen suits. There is good reason why a judicial action can bar a 
citizen suit, while an administrative order will not. Judicial actions are public, administra- 
tive actions may not be. Even a consent decree filed in court is a public document and, 
under Department of Justice procedures, requires a public notice and comment period 
before entry as a judicial order. 28 C.F.R. $ 50.7 (2004). 
231 See Miller, supra note 215, at n.439-441 and accompanying text. 
232 Justice Scalia's concurrence, joined by Justices O'Connor and Stevens, was even 
more restrictive. Gwatlney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 
49,67-71 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring). While the Court's opinion required the plaintiff to 
allege continuing violations in good faith, the concurrence would have required plaintiff to 
prove violations occurred at the time the complaint was filed, as a requirement of subject 
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Some might say that the thirteen to ten count of anti- and pro- 
environmental results in the Court's decisions233 self-evidently 
demonstrates the Court's anti-environmental bias. They might say 
that bias is more self-evident in the eleven to four count of deci- 
sions since 1980. That broad proposition, however, does not with- 
stand scrutiny. Two of the thirteen decisions with anti- 
environmental results involved or avoided constitutional protec- 
tions or limitations.234 They do not reflect an anti-environmental 
bias by the Court unless the proponent argues that the Court 
applies the Constitution more strictly under environmental statutes 
than under other statutes or that the Constitution should be 
applied less stringently under environmental statutes than under 
other statutes. Both are dubious propositions. Two of the remain- 
ing eleven decisions with anti-environmental results apply federal 
sovereign immunity from suits by derived from the 
Supremacy Clause of the Con~titution,2~~ and invoke the accompa- 
matter jurisdiction. Id. It further suggested that if violations did not occur at that time, the 
plaintiff suffered no injury at that time and had no standing to file the suit. Id. 
233 See infra Table B. 
See Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412 (1987); Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook 
County (SWANCC) v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159 (2001). In Tull 
the Court decided that the Seventh Amendment to the U.S. Constitution required the 
opportunity for a jury decision on whether a defendant violated the CWA before a court 
could assess a civil penalty, although the judge retained equitable discretion to fix the 
amount of the penalty. 481 U.S. at 425-26. In SWANCC the Court interpreted CWA 
5 404 not to require permits to fill isolated wetlands to avoid deciding whether the regula- 
tion of isolated wetlands is within congressional authority under the Commerce Clause of 
the U.S. Constitution, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 2. SWANCC, 531 U.S. .at 174. As an 
interpretation of the CWA's "navigable waters" jurisdiction, the opinion is questionable 
and can be labeled as having an anti-environmental result. As a means of avoiding the 
constitutional issue, however, it follows traditional judicial doctrine. ESKRIDGE, supra note 
166, at 325. Moreover, Professor Lazarus suggests the Court might well have held isolated 
wetlands were not within Congress' Commerce Clause jurisdiction. Lazarus, Three Years 
Later, supra note 2, at 660-64. Such an outcome would follow in the footsteps of recent 
decisions in United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (involving a federal statute outlaw- 
ing possession of firearms near schools), and United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) 
(involving a federal statute providing a civil remedy for victims of gender-motivated vio- 
lence), where the Court found that both of these statutes were beyond Congress' Com- 
merce Clause jurisdiction. Under this logic the Court could have held that Commerce 
Clause jurisdiction did not extend to isolated wetlands and this holding could not then be 
viewed as motivated by anti-environmental bias as much as by a generally restrictive view 
of federal authority. 
235 United States Dep't of Energy v. Ohio ("DOE"), 503 U.S. 607 (1992); EPA v. Cal. ex 
rel. State Water Res. Control Bd., 426 U.S. 200 (1976). 
236 U.S. CONST. art. VI, 5 2. 
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nying cross-cutting judicial doctrine that waivers of sovereign 
immunity should be interpreted narrowly.237 Again, they do not 
reflect an anti-environmental bias by the Court unless the propo- 
nent argues that the Court interprets waivers of sovereign immu- 
nity more strictly in environmental statutes than in other statutes 
or the proponent argues the Court should interpret waivers of sov- 
ereign immunity less strictly in environmental statutes than in 
other statutes.238 Again, both arguments are dubious. Three of the 
remaining nine decisions with anti-environmental results are in 
judicial review of EPA final actions.239 Each of the three decisions 
upheld the EPA7s action, reflecting judicial deference to the 
agency's interpretation of the statute it implements. If they reflect 
an anti-environmental bias, the bias begins with the EPA, not the 
Court. These seven decisions don't reflect an anti-environmental 
bias. Instead, they reflect the normal interplay between a statute 
and the rest of the legal system. 
The remaining six decisions with anti-environmental results240 
have much in common. All six were citizen suits or private federal 
common law of nuisance actions. By contrast, only one of the 
Court's ten decisions with pro-environmental results was a citizen 
suit or private federal common law of nuisance action.241 All six of 
the decisions contained analytical errors, including all of the seri- 
ous or multiple errors noted.242 By contrast, only four of the 
Court's ten decisions with pro-environmental results contained 
analytical errors and none of them were serious or multiple.243 
Finally, the EPA was not a party in five of the six decisions. By 
contrast, the EPA was a party in six of the Court's ten decisions 
with pro-environmental results.244 While some of these three fac- 
tors are also at play in the seven other decisions with anti-environ- 
237 Ruckleshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680, 685-86 (1983) (citing McMahon v. United 
States, 342 U.S. 25, 27 (1951)). 
238 Justice White's separate opinion, in DOE, 503 U.S. 607, 629 (1992) (White, J., con- 
curring in part and dissenting in part), however, suggests that if the Court were more 
attuned to environmental values, it could have come to a different conclusion. 
239 Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91 (1992); Chem. Mfrs. Ass'n v. NRDC, 470 U.S. 
116 (1985); and Train v. Colorado Public Interest Research Group, Inc., 426 U.S. 1 (1976). 
240 City of Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557 (1992); Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. 
Chesapeake Bay Found. 484 U.S. 49 (1987); Int'l Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481 
(1987); Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305 (1982); Middlesex County Sewerage 
Auth. v. Nat'l Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1 (1981); City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 
U.S. 304 (1981). 
z41 See infra Table B. 
242 Id. 
243 Id. 
2M Id. 
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mental results and cross-cutting issues, their influence does not 
appear to be as great as the nature of the legal issues involved in 
those seven decisions.245 
This analysis suggests that the anti-environmental bias of the 
Court is less than it seems. More than half of its CWA decisions 
with anti-environmental results are adequately explained by the 
nature of the issues involved, constitutional protections or limita- 
tions, sovereign immunity, or judicial review of agency action. In 
the remainder of the decisions the results may be explained less by 
an anti-environmental bias than by combinations of three other 
factors: the nature of the action as a citizen suit or private federal 
common law of nuisance action, the EPA's absence as a party, and 
the presence of an analytical error. 
While this analysis suggests the apparent anti-environmental bias 
of the Court is much less than it seems or may not even exist, the 
analysis raises two equally disturbing suggestions. One is the 
apparent bias of the Court against private enforcement, leading to 
anti-environmental decisions and analytical errors. The other is 
that the EPA's absence as a party from a case contributes to the 
anti-environmental results, particularly when other federal parties 
are present as polluting defendants. The most likely redress to a 
bias against private enforcement is legislation re-enforcing the 
importance of citizen suits, although citizen suit initiatives in 
today's Congress probably would not have positive results. The 
most likely redress to the absence of the EPA as the federal party 
in a suit is legislation requiring federal parties who are violating 
defenders to hire special counsel to represent them, leaving the 
Solicitor General to represent the EPA as amicus or allowing EPA 
to represent itself as amicus. The Department of Justice has an 
internal procedure to allow agencies to comment on the Solicitor's 
positions regarding statutes they administer, but it does not assure 
their interpretations will be adopted by the S o l i ~ i t o r . ~ ~ ~  
245 At least one of the three factors was present in all seven decisions. In addition, five 
had analytical errors, three did not have the EPA as a party, and one was a citizen suit. See 
infra Table B. 
246 Interview with John Crudin, Deputy Assistant Att'y General, Envtl. and Natural 
Res. Div., Dep't of Justice, in Chi., Ill. (Aug. 7, 2005). 
Heinonline - -  24 Va. Envtl. L.J. 174 2005-2006 
20051 Supreme Court Water Jurisprudence 175 
TABLE A: SUPREME COURT DECISIONS UNDER 
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY 
ADMINISTERED STATUTES 
Clean Water Act 
Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91 (1992) ("Arkansas v. 
Oklahoma"). 
Chemical Manufacturers Ass'n v. NRDC, 470 U.S. 116 (1985) 
("CMA"). 
City of Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557 (1992) ("Dague"). 
City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304 (1981) ("Milwaukee 
11"). 
Costle v. Pacific Legal Foundation, 445 U.S. 198 (1980) ("Pacific 
Legal Found."). 
Crown Simpson Pulp Co. v. Costle, 445 U.S. 193 (1980) ("Crown 
Simpson"). 
E.I. du Pont de Nemours and Co. v. Train, 430 U.S. 112 (1977) ("E. 
I. du Pont"). 
EPA v. California ex rel. State Water Resources Control Board, 
426 U.S. 200 (1976) ("California Water Board"). 
EPA v. National Crushed Stone Assn., 449 U.S. 64 (1989) 
("Crushed Stone7'). 
Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services 
(TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167 (2000) ("Laidlaw"). 
Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd., v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation, 484 
U.S. 49 (1987) ("Gwaltney "). 
International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481 (1987) 
("Ouellette"). 
Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clammers 
Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1 (1981) ("Sea Clammers"). 
PUD No. 1 of Jefferson County v. Washington Dept. of Ecology, 
511 U.S. 700 (1994) ("PUD No. 1"). 
Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps 
of Engineers, 531 U.S. 159 (2001) ("SWANCC"). 
South Florida Water Management District v. Miccosukee Tribe of 
Indians, 541 U.S. 95 (2004) ("Miccosukee"). 
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Train v. City of New York, 420 U.S. 35 (1975) ("City of New 
York"). 
Train v. Colorado Public Interest Research Group, Inc., 426 U.S. 1 
(1976) ("Colorado PIRG"). 
Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412 (1987) ("Tull"). 
United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121 
(1985) ("Riverside Bayview"). 
United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242 (1980) ("Ward"). 
United States Department of Energy v. Ohio, 503 U.S. 607 (1992) 
("DOE"). 
Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305 (1982) ("Romero- 
Barcelo"). 
Clean Air Act 
Adamo Wrecking Co. v. U.S., 434 U.S. 566 (1978). 
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
Department of Transportation v. Public Citizen, 541 U.S. 742 
(2004). 
Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227 (1986). 
Engine Manufacturers Ass'n v. South Coast Air Quality Manage- 
ment District, 541 U.S. 246 (2004). 
EPA v. Brown, 431 U.S. 99 (1977). 
General Motors Corp. v. United States, 496 U.S. 530 (1990). 
Harrison v. PPG Industries, Inc., 446 U.S. 578 (1980). 
Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air, 
483 U.S. 711 (1987). 
Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air, 
478 U.S. 546 (1986). 
Ruckleshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680 (1983). 
Whitman v. American Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457 (2001). 
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act 
Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557 (1992). 
City of Chicago v. Environmental Defense Fund, 511 U.S. 326 
(1 994). 
City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978). 
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Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, 493 U.S. 20 (1989). 
Key Tronic Corp. v. United States, 511 U.S. 809 (1994). 
Meghrig v. KFC Western, Inc., 516 U.S. 479 (1996). 
Stringfellow v. Concerned Neighbors in Action, 480 U.S. 370 
(1987). 
United States Department of Energy v. Ohio, 503 U.S. 607 (1992). 
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Lia- 
bility Act 
Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Aviall Services, Inc., 125 Sup. Ct. 577 
(2004). 
Exxon Corp. v. Hunt, 475 U.S. 355 (1986). 
Key Tronic Corp. v. United States, 511 U.S. 809 (1994). 
Meghrig v. KFC Western, Inc., 516 U.S. 479 (1996). 
Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989). 
Thomas v. Outboard Marine Corp., 479 U.S. 1002 (1986). 
United States v. Best Foods, 524 U.S. 51 (1998). 
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act 
Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 125 Sup. Ct. 1788 (2004). 
Mobay Chemical Corp. v. Costle, 439 U.S. 320 (1979) 
Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Col, 467 U.S. 986 (1984). 
Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Products, 473 U.S. 568 
(1985). 
Wisconsin Public Intervener v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597 (1991). 
Oil Pollution Act 
United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89 (2000). 
Marine Protection, Research and Sanctuaries Act 
Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clammers 
Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1 (1981). 
Emergency Planning and Community Right to Know Act 
Safe Drinking Water Act 
Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83 (1998). 
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Stringfellow v. Concerned Neighbors in Action, 480 U.S. 370 
(1987). 
National Environmental Policy Act 
Aberdeen & Rockfish R. Co. v. Students Challenging Regulatory 
Actions Procedures (S.C.R.A.P.), 422 U.S. 289 (1975). 
Baltimore Gas & Electric Co. v. NRDC, 462 U.S. 87 (1983). 
Department of Transportation v. Public Citizen, 541 U.S. 752 
(2004). 
Flint Ridge Development Co. v. Scenic Rivers Ass'n of Oklahoma, 
426 U.S. 776 (1976). 
Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390 (1976). 
Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, 497 U.S. 871 (1990). 
Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 
(1988). 
Marsh v. Oregon Natural Resources Council, 490 U.S. 360 (1989). 
Metropolitan Edison Co. v. People Against Nuclear Energy, 460 
U.S. 766 (1983). 
Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clammers 
Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1 (1981). 
Robertson v. Methew Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332 (1989). 
Stryker's Bay Neighborhood Council v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223 
(1980). 
United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Actions Proce- 
dures (SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669 (1973). 
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources 
Defense Council, 435 U.S. 519 (1978). 
Weinberger v. Catholic Action of HawaiiJPeace Education Project, 
454 U.S. 139 (1981). 
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